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28 MARCH 1990



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BURMA

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Election Committee Announces Party Logos

90OG0135A Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian
17 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] Bangkok, AFP/MERDEKA 13 February—On 12 February the Burmese General Elections Committee assigned symbols to the nine political parties which will take part in the free general elections which, according to present plans, will be held on 27 May. This was stated on a Burmese radio broadcast heard in Bangkok.

This is the first time that the Burmese General Election Commission has assigned symbols to the respective political parties. The symbols will henceforth be officially used by the political parties in the campaign prior to the general elections.

The military regime now in power has been forced to revise its governing policies. The military authorities, who took over power from the civilian government on 18 September 1988, accepted proposals from the people to hold free, general elections. In 1989 the military authorities issued a statement that the elections will be held in 1990.

At the same time the government agreed to the participation of Aung San Suu Kyi, an opposition figure and leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), in the forthcoming elections. Since July 1989 Aung San Suu Kyi has been subjected to house arrest after previously being imprisoned for having carried on a campaign for democracy and having opposed the military government.

In 1988 Gen Saw Maung issued orders to terminate pro democracy demonstrations against the government. Since then this policy was changed with the government agreeing to hold free general elections, whereas for 26 years Myanmar (Burma) had only permitted one political party to function.

The NLD, which is an old political party, changed its election symbol from the peacock to a peasant's hat. The Party for Democracy and Peace, led by former Prime Minister U Nu, adopted the symbol of an alarm clock. Meanwhile, the Unity Party, which is the Burmese Socialist Party, adopted the symbol of a stalk of paddy.

The General Election Commission advised every political party to avoid using symbols which have religious significance, such as animals and stars.

STATE OF CAMBODIA**Japanese To Resume Telephone Links**42000053 *Tokyo KYODO in English* 8 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 8 KYODO—Japan's international telecommunications giant, KDD, will resume telephone communication with Cambodia via Moscow on Friday, breaking a 15-year phone blackout, the company announced Thursday.

The resumption of telecommunications with the country is made possible by the reopening of telephone service between the Soviet Union and Cambodia late last year, KDD said.

Operator-assisted calls will cost 2,880 yen for the first three minutes and 480 yen for each additional minute, the company said.

Planning Chief Expects Expanded Ties With Non-Socialist Bloc42000046A *Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English*
15 Jan 90 p 21

[Excerpts] Phnom Penh (AFP)—Cambodia wants to double its imports from capitalist neighbors to offset an expected drop in products arriving from Eastern Europe, a Cambodian Planning Ministry official said late last week.

"We anticipate a significant growth this year in our economic relations with capitalist countries in the region, such as Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and Japan," said Un Buntha, deputy director of the ministry's General Planning Department.

He said Cambodia was developing its regional ties in a bid to protect the nation's "already feeble economy" from any major blows that might result from the upheavals in Eastern Europe.

Cambodia runs a massive trade deficit with other socialist nations according to official figures.

"Last year, we balanced our imports and exports with capitalist Asian nations at \$17 million, but we increase our exports by about \$1 million," Buntha said.

"The currently signed agreements with East European nations under our 1986-90 plan will be respected, but we don't know what will happen after that, given the important changes under way there," he said.

Buntha said Cambodia was open to trade from capitalist nations outside the region as well.

"Other capitalist countries, notably France, would be welcome in Cambodia, especially as there are sizable Cambodian communities in these nations that are inclined toward investing here," he said. [passage omitted]

The government of Prime Minister Hun Sen was installed by Vietnam after its December 1978 invasion

to overthrow the fanatical Khmer Rouge regime responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of Cambodians during a nearly four-year isolationist rule.

Vietnam's principal ally is the Soviet Union.

Buntha said that last year Cambodia's imports from socialist nations were worth 122 million roubles (\$97.6 million), while exports to them totalled 23 million roubles (\$18.4 million).

For this year, imports from socialist nations have been pegged at 135 million roubles (\$108 million) while exports should total 42 million roubles (\$33.6 million), he said, adding that the figures covered only government trade, as statistics were not available from the private sector which has been expanding rapidly. [passage omitted]

The Soviet Union provides Cambodia's total supply of some 100,000 tons of petroleum, according to Buntha.

The development of relations with capitalist nations could go ahead despite the ongoing war in Cambodia, said another official, but added: "It isn't easy." [passage omitted]

"These battles have made overland transport in the direction of Thailand very difficult, but our coastline and two ports—Koh Kong (to the west) and Kompong Som (south of Phnom Penh) are secure and well-protected," the source said.

Indian Official Hands Over Rice Aid in Kompong SomBK2502111990 *Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian* 0430 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Summary] On the morning of 23 February, at a ceremony in Kompong Som City, the acting charge d'affaires of the Indian Embassy in Cambodia handed over 5,000 tonnes of rice to Kong Sam-ol, vice chairman of the State of Cambodia's Council of Ministers.

In his address, the Indian official reviewed relations between the two sides, highlighting India's efforts to assist Cambodia in the fields of education, culture, public health, and economy.

In his reply, Kong Sam-ol thanked India for the assistance and stressed the need for further assistance from various countries, particularly friendly India.

Battambang Military Chief Comments on War42000046B *Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English*
4 Feb 90 p 2

[Excerpt] Battambang (Reuter)—The tranquility of the tropical night is shattered suddenly by the loud, flat bangs of the mortar barrage, soon joined by the staccato chatter of automatic rifle fire and the bass of machine guns.

With peaks of intensity and pauses, the battle rages for 40 minutes.

The official explanation later on Friday morning from Chea Ros, military chief of Cambodia's second-biggest town, was of a "small" clash provoked by Khmer Rouge guerrillas attempting to steal rice from a village seven kilometers outside Battambang. No one was hurt, he said.

Like most accounts of clashes, his version could not be verified independently. Foreign reporters, on a rare trip around northwestern areas that are the focus of the fighting, heard the battle but were not allowed to visit the site.

For ordinary people in a wide arc from Sisophon, a town of 56,000 people, 60 km northwest of Battambang, and Pursat, 100 km southwest along the road to Phnom Penh, the battle was all too ordinary.

During the day there is no sign of the war between the Khmer Rouge-dominated resistance alliance and troops of the Phnom Penh government.

Farmers work the fields, markets bustle, soldiers doze in hammocks slung in the shade.

But fear descends with the darkness.

"Every night there is fighting," said a woman in the market of Muong, halfway down the road to Pursat, a highway mostly stripped of its surface by tank tracks and neglect.

"I am afraid every night. I am afraid the Khmer Rouge will come back," she said.

Her fears were heightened on January 23, a night on which, Cambodian officials say, the Khmer Rouge launched a series of coordinated strikes against road and rail bridges between Battambang and Pursat.

At least five were destroyed and the only railway line into the northwest was cut at several other points.

One of the rail bridges was at Muong.

"About 120 Khmer Rouge came over the field just before one in the morning and split into two groups, one heading for the bridge and the other for my control post," said police Sergeant Sin Suong.

His 22 men could not save the bridge but they killed eight Khmer Rouge and wounded three without loss, Sin Suong said.

Fear is even more palpable in Sisophon, where several people said they had heard the guerrillas had announced that the town was their next target.

The military there were clearly nervous, admitting the guerrillas had seized a village only 25 km away on the road leading north. A counter-attack would be launched "when we have the opportunity," they said.

So nervous were military commanders in Sisophon that they rushed foreign reporters out of town before dark despite earlier assurances of an overnight stop in the town during a government-organized trip to the region.

They made no mention of a sabotage attack on an arms depot that the guerrillas claimed to have carried out only hours before the journalists arrived on Thursday morning.

But journalists believed this might have been one cause of the intense nervousness.

Less tension was evident at Poipet, a tiny collection of battered buildings on the Thai border, but two armored personnel carriers accompanied the reporters on the lurching drive from Sisophon.

In Battambang, which Chea Ros declared safe despite a dusk to dawn curfew military nervousness was evident. The reporters were followed everywhere by an armed escort.

Chea Ros said the early Friday morning battle was only the second guerrilla attack in the vicinity in the past month, although reports reaching Phnom Penh say fighting around the town is frequent.

Early in January the Khmer Rouge said they had launched an overnight attack in which they seized key installations for four hours and left them burning.

Reporters saw no evidence of such a serious attack on the city, but one shopper in the town market was swiftly hustled away by a man in plainclothes when she started to tell reporters in English that there was fighting every night.

Chea Ros explained nighttime shooting as soldiers signalling all-well to each other and daytime firing as troops out hunting game.

He said the fighting in the current dry season was much heavier than in past years following the troop pullout declared by Vietnam in September. [passage omitted]

Civil Aviation Department Increases Air Fares

BK2203062990 Phnom Penh SPK in English
0411 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK March 22—The Cambodian Civil Aviation Department has decided to increase air fares three to six-fold.

According to a tariff issued by the department, the fare for flying from Phnom Penh to the provinces of Siem Reap, Battambang and Stung Treng and to Kompong Som City is increased to 11,600 riel (Cambodian currency), or six times more than the current rate and that for flying between Phnom Penh and Koh Kong Province is raised to 16,000 riel.

On international airways, the fare for the Phnom Penh-Moscow route is increased to 264,196 riel, or 1,028 U.S. dollars, and the fare for the Phnom Penh-Vientiane line to 30,840 riel, or 120 U.S. dollars. The fares for the Phnom Penh-Hanoi and Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh City lines would be fixed later.

The department said that the increasing of air fares here is done in keeping with the rising of air fares by EAPT [expansion unknown] at 25 percent.

CAMBODIA

JPRS-SEA-90-011
28 March 1990

Red Cross Appeals for Aid for Needy People

*BK2103033190 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 20 Mar 90*

[Text] On 15 March, the Cambodian Red Cross Committee reported that some of our people who have fled from villages and communes in the western provinces, particularly Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey, are now suffering from shortages of daily necessities. The Cambodian Red Cross Committee, therefore, appeal to all generous persons to please donate materials for distribution to the needy people as soon as possible.

Our committee hopes to receive the kindness of all generous persons. Donation can be made daily at the office of the Cambodian Red Cross as of the issuance of this appeal.

Stung Treng Province Restores Road to Airport

*BK1803072490 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0400 GMT
18 Mar 90*

[Excerpt] Phnom Penh, 18 Mar (SPK)—The communications, transport, and posts service of Stung Treng Province,

300 km northeast of Phnom Penh, is restoring a road linking the provincial seat to the airport. For this work, over seven million riels—six million come from the national budget—have been made available. This road will be open to traffic around March. [passage omitted]

Aid Distributed to Banteay Meanchey War Victims

*BK1303051990 Phnom Penh SPK in English
0411 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK March 13—Recently Phnom-penhians have distributed a good quantity of gifts to war victims at remote areas in the province of Banteay Meanchey, some 360 km northwest of Phnom Penh, where Sonsannians and Sihanoukists in their harassments caused losses of lives and property to the local population.

The gifts included 10,000 plates and bowls, 2,480 cooking pots, 5570 articles of clothing, and a quantity of commodities worth more than two million riels (Cambodian currency).

Netherlands To Delay Aid as Protest of Executions

90OG0136C Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian
22 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] The Hague, Wednesday [21 February]—The Netherlands Government intends to delay 27 million guilders (about 25 billion rupiah) in economic aid to Indonesia as a protest of the execution of four perpetrators of the Indonesian Communist Party's coup d'etat action known as G-30-S/PKI [30 September Movement/ Indonesian Communist Party]. The Netherlands views Indonesia's action as a violation of human rights.

Netherlands Foreign Aid Ministry spokesman Pim de Groot said Wednesday that his government's action will be announced at the end of the week. Netherlands news media, such as the daily VOLKSKRANT, on Wednesday also carried Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers's statement to Parliament about the government's contemplation of delaying aid to Indonesia. Official action will be taken by Netherlands Minister of Foreign Aid Jan Pronk.

Pim de Groot said, "This delay of aid funds is a protest against the execution of the political prisoners."

The Netherlands' action is related to the execution of four members of the Cakrabirawa unit. They were Sergeant Major Yohanes Surono (60), Chief Sergeant Simon Petrus Soleiman (58), Sergeant Major Satar Surjanto (60), and Noor Rohayan (58).

They were directly responsible for the kidnapping and brutal murder of at least four of the six generals and one junior officer on 30 September 1965. Soleiman was known to be the leader of the squad that kidnapped and murdered Major General Soeprapto. Surono and his squad seized Brigadier General Sutoyo. Surjanto and his men went to Major General S. Parman's home. Rohayan and his colleagues did the same thing to the other generals.

The brutal G-30-S/PKI action was smashed, and these suspects were immediately arrested. A military court tried them in 1969 and condemned them to death. After being held for nearly 25 years, the suspects were taken last Friday [16 February] from Cipinang Prison to a secret location, where they were executed by a firing squad.

Because of its opinion of the executions, the Netherlands for the first time is delaying economic assistance as a protest. According to the ASSOCIATED PRESS, the Netherlands earlier had made merely oral protests to Indonesia over what they considered a violation of human rights.

Legal Issue

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas commented on the protest action upon his return at the end of last week from the ASEAN-European Community meeting in Kuching, Sarawak. In reply to reporters' questions at Sukarno-Hatta Airport, Alatas stated that the executions were not a humanitarian issue but a legal one.

Alatas said the men were executed following a military justice process, under which they were condemned to death. The executions were delayed so long merely because the justice process moved with difficulty and delay. The trial of the suspects began in 1969, and they were sentenced to death. Some of them applied to the president for clemency in 1971 but were refused. The rejection was publicized in 1987.

In a hearing before DPR [Parliament] Commission I last Wednesday [21 February], Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, director general for political affairs of the Department of Foreign Affairs, explained the issue in reply to questions from DPR members. Reiterating Foreign Minister Alatas' statement, Sastrohandoyo said the executions were conducted with great regret, bearing in mind that the men were also Indonesians. This was a legal issue, however, and not a humanitarian one.

The executions took place not long before revelation of the government's plan to restore the voting rights of all former G-30-S/PKI political prisoners for the upcoming 1992 general elections. Department of Home Affairs data indicate that there are more than 1.8 million former G-30-S/PKI political prisoners and that only 40,000 of them have not yet received restoration of voting rights. The government plans to restore voting rights to all 40,000 people for the elections.

According to Home Minister Rudini, the execution of the four suspects was not related to plans for restoration of voting rights to former G-30-S/PKI political prisoners.

Brigadier General Nurhadi, KAPUSPEN ABRI [chief of Armed Forces Information Center], said the four executed Cakrabirawa men were not ordinary PKI members but were perpetrators of the coup d'etat and murderers of the generals. Nurhadi vigorously denied that the firing squad execution hurt Indonesia's human rights image in the eyes of the world. The 27 million guilders in aid being delayed by the Netherlands is thought to be part of the 192 million guilders, or \$130.2 million, in Netherlands help being channeled to Indonesia through the IGGI [Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia]. The IGGI aid funds consist of \$80.3 million in development assistance loans and \$49.9 million in special aid for Indonesian balance-of-payments problems.

The delayed 27 million guilders, or \$14.3 million, is said to be part of the \$49.9 million in special aid. The Netherlands is one of the main members of the IGGI, which meets each year in The Hague to discuss soft-loan aid to Indonesia.

Minister Calls for Decentralizing Economic Development

90OG0136B Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian
20 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] Ujung Pandang, KOMPAS—The decentralization of national development management is needed as we approach the takeoff phase. Decentralization is not merely a

consequence of the central government's declining revenues but is a requirement for development in the framework of making maximal use of regional resources.

Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, minister of state for reform of state apparatus, submitted this concept in Ujung Pandang on Monday [19 February] at the South Sulawesi governor's working meeting with regents and mayors from throughout South Sulawesi.

According to the minister, the country's extensive area makes development extremely complex. Development for making optimal use of regional resources is not conducted with merely one dimension in view, for the unity and integrity of the nation must also be considered. "These two matters constitute the basic inspiration for Law 5 of 1974, which emphasizes regional autonomy at regional level II," he said.

According to the minister, it is still hard to find the true face of autonomy. There is concern that level II autonomy will have political rights as its goal. Such concern has no basis, however, for Indonesia is not a state/federal country. Thus, the emphasizing of autonomy at the regional level II means the transfer of some central government administration to the regions.

Minister Sarwono said level II regional government is the frontline apparatus and thus best understands dynamics that develop in the community. Making regional governments more capable and self-sufficient in serving the community is a development objective.

Serving the Community

At another point in his remarks, Minister Sarwono emphasized steps that can be taken in order to improve service to the community. The first step is to make the local government more capable, self-sufficient, and autonomous in the implementation of national development. The second step is to improve the regional government's service to the community. These two steps will make the state apparatus more valuable, its procedures clearer and neater, and its work more efficient.

Sarwono said level II regional governments should identify potentials existing in their areas. In this way, an understanding of the important and strategic meaning of level II autonomy will not grow and develop entirely from above but will originate at regional level II also. "In the final analysis, the granting of autonomy to a level II region depends on the readiness and capability of the region itself," said Sarwono.

The governor's working meeting with regents, mayors, regional office chiefs, and agency heads from throughout South Sulawesi is being held from 19 to 21 February. Its purpose is to spell out the results of the recent meeting of all Indonesian governors.

According to South Sulawesi Governor Prof Dr Achmad Amiruddin Pabittei, the working meeting will also include discussions of South Sulawesi's readiness to be a

center of government activity and of developments related to acceptance of national development policies, which in REPELITA V [Fifth 5-Year Development Plan] are oriented toward Eastern Indonesia.

Parliament Member Elected Most Popular Politician

*90OG134C Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN
in Indonesian 18 Feb 90 p 5*

[Text] Jakarta—Dr. H. Jailani Naro, attorney at law and deputy chairman of Parliament and of the MPR [People's Consultative Assembly], as well as a member of the Development Unity Party [PPP] faction, was elected "the most popular politician of 1989." Meanwhile, 10 other parliamentarians from four factions were selected as the best members of Parliament in 1989. The awards were made on 14 February on separate occasions by the press corps assigned to Parliament and the MPR.

Before extending the special award to Dr H. Jailani Naro at a ceremony held in his office in the Parliament building in the Senayan area of Jakarta, Bruno Kaka Wawo, chairman of the press corps assigned to Parliament and the MPR, said that Doctor Naro's selection as the most popular politician of 1989 was contained in a Letter of Decision dated 17 January 1990. This decision was based, among other things, on a careful evaluation of every member of Parliament and the MPR by journalists belonging to the Parliament and MPR press corps during the course of 1989.

The award, which was decided on at a plenary meeting of the Parliament and MPR press corps held on 6 January 1990, also stated that Naro was considered capable of providing the color of democracy and of creating the right moment, providing a stimulus to the development of Pancasila [Five Principles of the Nation] Democracy and political life in general.

In that connection, speaking before reporters who made the award, Doctor Naro made no effort to hide his feelings in connection with this mark of appreciation.

He said: "This is an unusual step, and I would underline what was said by your chairman: that with the award of this honor other politicians will be further encouraged to seek this mark of appreciation."

The former general chairman of the Central Executive Council of the PPP also asked whether it was proper for him to receive the award. He said that what he had done up to now was only fitting in the framework of seeking to establish Pancasila Democracy. He also admitted that as far as he is concerned personally, the award would have no meaning without the assistance of the reporters, who reported his ideas and opinions to the community at large.

In this connection on 18 February at a Jakarta restaurant an award was also extended to the "10 Best Members of Parliament in 1989." Those chosen included: Aberson Marle Sihaloho from the PDI [Indonesian Democracy

Party], Anang Adenansi (KP) [Functional Development party], B. P. Messakh (KP), Budi Hardjono (PDI), Hamzah Haz (PPP), Imam Churmen (PPP), Marzuki Darusman (KP), Police Col Mrs Roekmini Koesoemoastoeti (Indonesian Armed Forces), and Major General Samsudin (Indonesian Armed Forces) [as printed; only nine names listed]. This list of names is in alphabetical order and is not based on any particular standing.

The program was also attended by leaders of the PPP and PDI factions in Parliament. Mrs Roekmini, Hamzah Haz, and General Samsudin did not attend because of the pressure of other duties. However, Mrs Roekmini sent a letter to the chairman of the parliamentary and MPR press corps which, among other things, mentioned that although she could not attend, she was there in spirit and extended her best wishes to the reporters.

On this occasion Bruno Kaka Wawo, the chairman of the parliamentary press corps, reviewed chronologically the process of selection of the 10 members of Parliament, following consideration of the names of 22 members of Parliament who had been nominated by reporters. The criteria used to select the 10 best members of Parliament included, among other things, their courage in expressing their opinions and differences of view with others and their ability to explain questions which they were responsible for in an innovative, intensive, continuous, and detailed way.

Other criteria included their ability to express their views sincerely and to reflect the aspirations of the people, as well as to engage in debate with skill and sincerity (in an inspirational way).

On this occasion B. P. Messakh represented the members of Parliament who were selected. He stated that this mark of appreciation by the reporters meant specifically that the parliamentarians chosen would act in a more responsible way as representatives of the people in always acting as spokesmen for the people's aspirations.

He stated: "What happened today was not exclusively because of the ability and courage of the members of Parliament. I think that we would have no importance if the reporters did not report our views and thoughts to the people."

Meanwhile, Thaheransyah Karim, the chairman of the PPP faction in Parliament, speaking in the name of the leaders of the various factions in Parliament, stated that what the reporters had done for the members of Parliament and the MPR was evidence of their interest in the way in which parliamentarians carried out their duties. He said that it was hoped that this award would encourage others to be selected as the best members of Parliament for 1990.

The simple ceremony was concluded in an informal way with reporters and members of Parliament lurching together.

Professor Pamudji New LEMHANAS Vice Governor
42130006A

[Editorial Report] As reported in the Jakarta daily KOMPAS on 5 March 1990, LEMHANAS (National Defense Institute) Governor Major General Soekarto recently announced the appointment of Professor Suparni Pamudji as vice governor of LEMHANAS, replacing Dr Hidayat Mukmin who will become an advisory member of the National Stability Coordinating Board (BAKORSTANAS). The National Defense Institute, as a national research and educational body, acts as advisor to the government on national social issues. The institute has conducted studies on matters of national concern, such as problems which may threaten the Pancasila ideology.

Government Studying Tax Relief for Long-Term Investments

*90OG0136A Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian
17 Feb 90 p 1*

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS—The government will study introduction of a special land and building tax (PBB) policy for long- and medium-term investments in Eastern Indonesia. This action is being taken because it is relatively difficult to expand investments in the region, particularly in the mining and estate sectors.

Minister of Home Affairs Rudini revealed this to KOMPAS on Friday [16 February] after a working meeting with all Indonesian governors at his Jakarta office. The minister acknowledged that the collection of PBB is difficult, particularly in the regional business sphere. It is, in fact, a dilemma that the governors find hard to resolve.

The difficulty, Rudini said, was reflected in questions the governors asked during their closed 4-day meeting, particularly when Coordinating Minister for Economics, Finance, Industry, and Development Control Radius Prawiro and Minister of Finance J.B. Sumarlin explained the background of funds allocation policies used in the 1990-91 RAPBN [Proposed National Budget].

A KOMPAS source said that in the closed meeting some governors made an issue of the dilemma between the complaints of potential investors and the need to meet the 620.4-billion-rupiah PBB target for fiscal 1990-91.

"The governors, in fact, frequently asked Minister Prawiro about PBB relief for long-term investors in the business sector," acknowledged Minister of Home Affairs Rudini.

Handled by Finance Minister

Although the 1990-91 PBB target is a reduction of 18.1 billion rupiah from the current fiscal year's target of 638.5 billion rupiah, potential investors will remain reluctant to invest capital if there is not a special PBB

policy for long-term investments, particularly in places with inadequate infrastructures. Facilities and infrastructures in the eastern region will not be renovated until next fiscal year, when funds for the purpose will be allocated for the nine provinces of the region.

If the dilemma is not promptly resolved, it will be difficult to achieve development objectives in the eastern region. Thus, the imbalance in growth between the East and the West will become increasingly difficult to overcome. Consequently, this imbalance could in the long term threaten the unitary state principle of the Republic of Indonesia. A special provision to give PBB relief for long-term investments is therefore needed immediately.

"The matter has been brought up, and it will be resolved by the finance minister," Rudini said. As examples, the home minister cited mining areas in the Moluccas and West Irian that have not been worked by their investors. It may be that exploration is under way, but no oil or minerals have been found. "Now, who must pay PBB in such a case? This will be resolved by the minister of finance," he declared.

What will be the form of special PBB policy? Will it be an exemption from PBB as long as the land is not producing, or will it be considered a tax debt, but without fines? Or will there be complete exemption? The home minister said, "No formulation has yet been made. It's a tax matter, isn't it?" The decision process must be a thorough one.

Rights To Make Input

Although the finance minister is the one who will study the issue, agencies and governors have the right to provide input. The regional governments must give full attention to collecting PBB, since most PBB revenues are transferred to local governments. Technical complaints from investors in the regional mining and estate sectors should be sent directly to the minister of finance, however.

The views expressed by the home minister were consistent with his closing message to the governors' working conference, in which he said that issues not resolved regionally should be brought to Jakarta for consultation and coordination.

According to the home minister, it is a big mistake to use PBB collection methods like that employed by the Padang Regional Government, which makes payment of PBB a condition for issuance of KTP's [residence identification cards]. Besides being too harsh, such methods are not instructive. PBB collection should be instructive and should be conducted through traditional institutions.

"In Bali, for example, anyone who does not pay PBB is ostracized by the traditional community. Thus, people become aware of their responsibility to pay taxes," Rudini explained. Collection methods that appear to be

"overreactions" are now banned. Regional governments must realize and instruct the public that the PBB is important to everyone, since the funds come back to the provinces to finance local development.

Village Taxes

With regard to regionally derived income (PAD), particularly at the village and subdistrict levels, the home minister warned that taxes imposed and collected by villages must not be taken over by government offices at higher echelons. Bicycle, ox cart, dog, and radio taxes received by villages must not be taken over by higher levels of government. "Villages are poor and have no income. Let these taxes be village income," Rudini declared.

Why do regents persist in appropriating taxes that should be the portion of villages? According to the home minister, it is because income that should be the rights of regencies has been taken over by provinces. This cannot be allowed to continue, for, like villages, the regencies get help from the central government, which pays village administration support to regencies in the amount of 15,000 rupiah for each village.

"Thus, there is no longer any excuse. I take a stern position, and my instructions are stern. If anyone, including the regent himself, violates my instructions, he must be prepared for dismissal. Dismissal will be sought immediately. This is the last warning that the situation will not be tolerated any longer," the home minister declared.

Industrial Complexes

The minister pointed out that because opportunities are wide open for investment in industrial complexes, many land speculators have become excited about taking part. There are indications of this in West Java (especially in Serang Regency), Central Java, and in some places in Sumatra. "I see that they tend more to selling land than to establishing industrial complexes," he said.

As an example, the home minister cited the case of an investor who applied for permission to acquire rights to 5,000 hectares of land. "Why is that much land needed for industry? Even the Pulogadung industrial complex has not yet used all of its 400 hectares," he said, shaking his head.

The home minister therefore asked that the processing of industrial complex applications be postponed to ensure their compliance with a list drawn up by the Department of Industry. This applies primarily to applications for sites in West Java, particularly in Tangerang, Bogor, Bekasi, and Purwakarta. The minister asked that regional governments that have already granted permission in principle immediately reexamine the applications to ensure compliance with the Industry Department's list.

The home minister issued these instructions because land allocation must take into account the welfare and legal rights of the people. Do not carelessly issue site permits and land acquisition permits (SIPT) if they will cause people to suffer. "I have therefore ordered postponement. The process has been haphazard," said Rudini.

Increase in University Research Programs Seen

90OG0134A Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 16 Feb 90
p 12

[Text] Jakarta, PELITA—The university research program has continued to increase, year by year. During the 1987/1988 academic year only 62 projects obtained direct funding from the Directorate General of Higher Education. However, during the past 3 years this total has increased to 350 projects and to 625 projects for the 1990/1991 academic year alone.

Prof Sukadji Ranuwihardjo, the director general of higher education, made this statement on 15 February in testimony before Committee IX of Parliament, which is chaired by Suryo Mardjio.

According to the director general of higher education, in addition to the larger number of research projects, interest in research is also increasing. This is shown in the number of research project proposals received, that is, a total of 900 proposals during the past academic year. Over the past 3 years about 1,900 proposals have been received. The results of the research, in addition to being made public in seminars, have also been distributed in the form of scholarly articles on the research.

Professor Sukadji said that every institute of higher education has prepared a 5-year research plan. He declared: "That needs to be translated into a priority list of which sectors should be emphasized and how much money can be allocated by the government."

University Students

According to Sukadji, a draft plan on new institutions for university students, replacing the NKK/BKK [Campus Life Normalization Program and University Students' Coordination Board], has been prepared in the form of a SMPT [Senate of Students of Institutions of Higher Education]. The leadership of this new institution for university students will be turned over fully to the students. Meanwhile, the participation of teachers in university student activities will continue, if needed.

It was also explained that the program for university student development during academic year 1990/1991 will include increasing scholarly activities in the curriculum of university students, such as competitions concerning productive, innovative activities, scholarly writing activities, university student management training, and scholarly activities exhibitions.

In addition, the Directorate General of Higher Education will sponsor a program for stimulating student

interests and activities, including the holding of a University Students Sports Week (POM) at the national and Southeast Asian levels. University student welfare will be given priority attention in the development of university student cooperatives.

According to the director general of higher education, a program for increasing campus resiliency will be carried out in the form of developing university student institutions, political education programs, work study programs, service in the armed forces, and the University Student Protection Program and the Program for Increasing University Student Participation in Development.

Meanwhile, the assigned goal of training 330,000 village school teachers under the Fifth 5-Year Development Plan has been coordinated with the D-II [Level Two Region]. Each year about 35,000 village school teachers will graduate from professional training throughout this period.

Price of Paddy Expected To Decrease

90OG0134B Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian
16 Feb 90 p 10

[Text] Jakarta, PELITA—Sukriya Atmaja, deputy chief of BULOG (Logistical Affairs Board), has stated that the paddy harvest will begin at the end of March 1990 and that the price of paddy will tend to decrease after the harvest begins.

Sukriya Atmaja made this statement in answer to questions from reporters after witnessing the signature of a cooperation agreement between the Directorate General of Taxation, BULOG, and GAPEGTI [Association of Indonesian Peasant Rice Millers] in Jakarta on 15 February.

However, according to the deputy chief of BULOG, a special committee will act to safeguard basic prices. He said: "If the price of paddy should decline, this would be the result of atmospheric conditions, such as frequent rains. And when the harvest is completed, DOLOG warehouses [Logistical Depots] in the provinces will be full."

In another part of his statement Sukriya Atmaja mentioned that with reference to food stocks in 1990 a more intensive effort will be made, compared to past years. It appears that the forthcoming paddy harvest will be an average one, even if it takes place during the rainy season. Under such circumstances there is concern that the farmers will not be able to dry their paddy. In that connection the problem will involve handling the drying of the paddy so that it can be processed further, he indicated.

Market Operation

Regarding market operations, BULOG will continue with them. In the city of Greater Jakarta alone market operations are small, involving about 140,000 tons of paddy. At present BULOG food stocks amount to about 1.7 million tons, held in warehouses and by the Indonesian Armed Forces. While rice is shipped from these stocks, new rice will also be

coming in from the forthcoming harvest. Stocks of food in 1990 will amount to about 2.0 million tons.

Food Coordination Meeting

In answer to a question from the press Sukriya Atmaja, deputy chief of BULOG, mentioned that on 27 February

a coordination meeting on food will be held in Jakarta, chaired by Dr Bustamil Arifin, the chief of BULOG.

The meeting is being held in particular to discuss the problem of food stocks in connection with the forthcoming paddy harvest, which will begin at the end of March.

Cultural Cooperation Agreement Signed With USSR
BK0503115590 Vientiane KPL in English 0928 GMT
5 Mar 90

[Text] Vientiane, March 5 (kpl)—The Lao PDR [People's Democratic Republic] and the Soviet Union have recently reached an agreement on the 1990 cultural and scientific cooperation, particularly on film and art.

This was disclosed at a press conference organized on March 2 at the Soviet Cultural Center here in the presence of the Lao deputy minister of information and culture Somnit Vankham.

According to the agreement, Soviet art and acrobat troupes will give performances and Soviet handicraft will be on display in Laos. In return, a Lao picture exhibition will be held in the Soviet Union and some Lao officials at the National School for Art and Music will be sent to study there. In addition, a number of Soviet feature films will be shown here in anticipation of the 15th founding anniversary of the Lao PDR. Besides, Lao officials will be sent to attend cultural training and field study in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, in recent years, has helped Laos build a 800-seat national circus theater and produce documentary films on Lao culture and others.

PRC Border Trade Atmospherics, Exchange Rates, Immigration

90OG0113A Vientiane PASASON in Lao 13 Dec 89 pp 3,4

[Excerpts] After working one week in Oudomsai Province, we returned to Louang Namtha Province in order to spend a week together with the work sections there. [passage omitted].

Although "Boten" is not known among the people of the central and southern regions, it is known in the north. This is a place where goods are exchanged and where Lao and Chinese people visit each other. [passage omitted]. When the Lao-Chinese trade takes place here the customs house is set up, along with the stores for selling their goods along the road in this village. The sign "Boten" appears on the buses bound from Oudomsai and from Louang Namtha Province.

As we turned on the road to Boten, after only 18 km we saw more than 10 trucks hauling goods from the Chinese border to Laos and back. On that day we saw buses from Louang Prabang, Xieng Thong, and Oudomsai provinces carrying plywood, oranges, and cardboard boxes. They brought back cement and other items packed in the boxes. When we arrived at the customs house we were allowed to cross the border to our meeting place. It was 1030. We saw Lao and Chinese trucks backed up against each other, busily transferring their goods. There were a few Chinese trucks parked along the border. When we inquired about the owners and passengers of the trucks we were told that they all went across the border to Laos

and would return in the evening to La District in China, approximately 60 km from the Lao border.

According to the customs official, at least two or three Lao and Chinese trucks transfer their goods each day. On some days there are more than ten. [passage omitted].

From the customs house we went to Boten to look for a restaurant. We learned that it was hard to differentiate the Lao from the Chinese. Most of the people in La, Xieng Houng, and San Yong in Yunan Province are Chinese [passage omitted].

At least 20 Chinese people of the Leu race at the border come to Laos every day by bicycle because the market is on the Lao side. Also, some Chinese come to Laos by truck from La, San Yong, and Xieng Houng districts to exchange their goods. These people are called "Ho" by the Thai people in the north. [passage omitted].

It is not only that Chinese come to Laos; there are also Lao who go to China. On the day we arrived, there was a group of people from Bo Keo Province, each carrying their bags. When we asked where they were going, they replied that they were going to La District. Some Lao visit China officially. Some go for business, others go to visit their relatives. There are many Leu in Lao and China. When the Lao and Chinese parties and governments normalized their relations, the border was opened. This made it easy for them to visit each other. All they need are visas from their province.

We asked how they made out in terms of money when the Lao went to China, and when the Chinese went to Laos. They said that they exchanged money. But how and with whom, as there are no bank officials to render this service? They said that they did it among themselves at the rate of 125 kip per 1 yuan. At the time we were there they even suggested that if we wanted to go to La District in China we would need only 200 yuan or 25,000 kip. With that much money we would be able to stay in comfort for several days. The bus fee for one person from the border to La District, a distance of about 60 kilometers, was about 4-5 yuan. The cost of the hotel is 5 yuan per day; for the best hotel it is 22 yuan per day. This does not include the cost of food. Therefore, it was not at all surprising to learn that many cadres I met in Louang Namtha Province had been to China once or twice.

Education Cooperation With SRV Province
BK1403113490 Vientiane KPL in English 0912 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Vientiane, March 14 (KPL)—An educational cooperation between the Lao and Vietnamese sister provinces of Savannakhet and Quang Tri will be promoted in 1990, according to the cooperation plan discussed at the conference on education held in the beginning of this month during the visit of the delegation of Savannakhet Province to Quang Tri.

According to the plan, the sides agreed to organize study tours and refresher courses on mathematics for teachers working with the last year's students of senior high schools.

The question on training of the teachers for vocational schools was also raised at the talks.

Trade Agreement Signed With SRV Phu Khanh Province

*BK1203093890 Vientiane KPL in English 0908 GMT
12 Mar 90*

[Text] Vientiane, March 12 (KPL)—An agreement on the economic and commercial cooperation was recently reached in the Vietnamese Phu Khanh Province between Phu Khanh [Province] and the Lao Savannakhet Province.

The two sides agreed that either side will open a department store in the other's capital township.

Phu Khanh, according to the agreement, will, in addition, help Savannakhet to build a sugar mill with a capacity of 50 tons a day. The document also covers the agro-forestry, and commercial cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit.

Construction Progress on Road Link to SRV

900G0113B Vientiane PASASON in Lao 12 Dec 89 p 1

[TEXT] Comrade Sommat Phonsena, chief of the Route 8 Construction Company, recently told us that with the

existing construction vehicles and the Lao technicians and workers whose ability has been tested in the construction of this route, we will try to finish 51 km of Route 8 by then end of 1990 in order to connect with the 81 km road section already completed by the Vietnamese.

Route 8 km 0 starts from the intersection in Ban Lao, Nam Thon Canton, Pak Kading District, Bolikhamsai Province; it will pass Pak Kading and Khamkert Districts in Bolikhamsai Province and Hinboun District in Khammouan Province, and it will end at km 132 in Vinh District of the SRV.

The company chief added that the company was responsible for the road construction from km 0 to km 51. The road will be cleared for 25 meters. It will be 8 meters on each side with the center 6 meters wide of asphalt pavement. The work was begun in April 1988. By now they have successfully cut 50 percent of the stone. The cost of construction for a distance of 1 km in 1988 was approximately 64 million kip, but for Route 9 the average cost per kilometer was only 32 million kip.

The company chief repeated that although we are facing many problems, we will resolutely complete this route assigned to us by the end of 1990. If it is possible we will go ahead with paving the road in order to score an achievement for welcoming the upcoming big 4-day celebration in 1990.

More Business Ventures With Soviets Announced

*90OG0139A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 23 Feb 90 p 17*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 12 Feb—Four more Soviet-Malaysian joint ventures are expected to be launched soon, Konstantin Peskov, Soviet trade commissioner in Malaysia, announced today, less than 4 months after the first joint venture was established.

He informed the press here that one of the new joint ventures has been set up and that talks on the three others are under way.

The first joint venture, Prodinterm Malaysia, Inc. Ltd., a business firm established in late October 1989, so far has exported about 80,000 tons of palm oil to the Soviet Union, he said.

The firm, which has paid-in capital of 800,000 ringgit, is a joint venture by Prodintorg, of the Soviet Union, and the Kuok Brothers Group.

Peskov said the second venture, Sovmal, Inc. Ltd., was formed by Atomenergoexport, of the Soviet Union, and Sri Pulut, Inc. Ltd.

This industrial business firm, which has a paid-in capital of 500,000 ringgit, in the next 3 months is to build a plant to manufacture high-technology equipment for road building and other purposes. The company was registered last December.

The company also plans to open a Malaysian restaurant in the Soviet Union, which will also sell Malaysian handicrafts, Peskov added.

Meanwhile, two Soviet businessmen under the Soviet Ministry of Chemicals and Petroleum Products are talking with the Guthrie Group about building a factory in Shah Alam to make medical rubber gloves and other rubber products for export to the Soviet Union and Asian countries.

The fourth joint venture involves the construction this year of an eye hospital on Langkawi Island in cooperation with Promet, Ltd. The Soviet Union will provide technology.

The fifth project, with the cooperation of an unidentified local firm, will involve research in the processing of seismic data and is still in the discussion stage. Preparations are expected to be completed this year.

French Electronics Company Expands Operations

*90OG0139B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 19 Feb 90 p 21*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 15 Feb—Thomson S.A., a French producer of electronic equipment for consumer use and defense systems, is further expanding its activities in Malaysia by opening an electronics component plant at Pulau Pinang under an investment of 68 million ringgit.

With the opening of the electronics plant next Tuesday [20 February], Thomson's total investment in Malaysia will be 120 million ringgit, which encompasses its four other plants at Kulim, Muar (two plants), and Kota Tinggi.

Francis Vanderberghe, president of Thomson-CSF International, said the investments represent commitment by the company, which has operated in Malaysia for 15 years.

From its plants in this country, Thomson last year produced consumer electronic products worth more than 1.2 billion ringgit, he said at a press conference here today.

He said that besides producing a number of electronic components Thomson also makes audio equipment such as hi-fi systems, miniature components, and radios for export to the entire world.

He said that although the firm has been in Malaysia for 15 years its presence is not felt very much.

"Because of Malaysia's strong economy, its industrious workers, and its far-sighted leaders, however, Thomson is prepared to expand its operations in this country," he declared.

In this connection, he said, Thomson is prepared to enhance bilateral business cooperation by transferring technology through the establishment of joint ventures.

With 15 years of operation in this country, the company has 15,000 employees.

Talks Held With French on Joint Production of Military Equipment

*90OG0139C Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 18 Feb 90 p 21*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 15 Feb—Thomson S.A., the foremost manufacturer of electronics for consumer and military use in France, is interested in setting up a firm in Malaysia to produce military equipment.

A representative of the company is now holding talks with certain parties about the possibility of forming a joint enterprise.

Francis Vanderberghe, vice president of Thomson-CSF International, was reluctant to identify the parties involved or the types of military equipment that might be manufactured in this country.

He said that, after being involved in Malaysia for 15 years in the production of consumer electronics, the Thomson company now wants to plunge into the field of specialized electronics for military and professional use.

If this wish is fulfilled, the action will create many added benefits for the Malaysian industrial sector and will use the services of professional engineers and skilled workers.

"An industry like this can create more sources of wealth for Malaysia," he stated in a press conference here today.

Vanderberghe said he is confident the joint venture can be established, because Thomson is the second largest manufacturer of military electronics in the world.

Finance Minister: No Pensions for New Civil Servants

*90OG0139D Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 18 Feb 90 p 2*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 13 Feb—In an effort to strengthen its financial position, the government will be forced to eliminate pensions for new government employees, Minister of Finance Datuk Paduka Daim Zainuddin said today.

New government employees should make contributions to the Employee Savings Association (KWSP), he said at the Banker's Club here in a luncheon meeting on "Critical Issues To Be Faced by the Economy in the 1990's."

Datuk Paduka Daim said also that the size of the public sector must be reduced in order to strengthen the financial position of the government.

Because the growth in tax revenues has declined, he also envisions the government as being forced to take the ultimate step of introducing a value added tax (VAT). The drop is partly because of reduced taxes and the concessions the government has given for several years.

He said that in order to reduce the government's burden caused by involvement in business he feels that one of the priorities in the 1990's will be "to privatize as many government corporations as we can." Thus, members of the business community need not worry about competition from the government in the 1990's.

Datuk Paduka Daim said the government's equity, loans, and collateral in these corporations total more than 29 billion ringgit and that privatization is one of the options for reducing this burden.

"Although government finances are better now, the budget still faces problems with large administrative expenditures for salaries, pensions, and debt payments, whereas revenues largely depend on petroleum. Expenditures are increasing steadily, but revenues are not growing," he said.

In order to keep strengthening its financial position, the government has no choice but to find new sources of income, he said. He envisions that the government will be forced to implement a VAT.

"Several countries known to have stronger footings have implemented a VAT. We may be forced to do the same," he said.

He said that from the fiscal aspect the government will add expenditures selectively and will continue its policy of careful integration. Financial and economic management will be planned for flexibility and responsiveness to any economic needs that may develop.

"Our objective for the government budget in the 1990's will be the biggest possible surplus in the current account," he said, adding that in this way the government will be able to reduce its loans and one day perhaps permanently eliminate foreign loans.

He said that in the last several years the government has paid about 13 billion ringgit of its foreign debts ahead of schedule. "If we had not done that, the rising values of several currencies would have reduced our foreign loans by as much as a half."

While realizing the existence of high costs, lack of skills, old technologies, and inadequate support resources, which are used mostly for the benefit of local production, he said he is also aware of the tight controls that still exist in the labor market, particularly with regard to the wage system.

"A flexible wage system like the one widely used in Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan has been tried and found to be useful in controlling costs and wages," he said.—BERNAMA

Mahathir Defends Views on Democracy

*90OG0140A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 20 Feb 90 p 1*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 19 Feb—Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamad declared that Malaysia does not feel it is wrong to avoid following Western principles of state management.

He said Malaysia has faith in Eastern views on civil government, public interests, and supervision of society.

"We do not need to be controlled completely by Western thinking, because we have our own way of thinking. I do not feel that we are always wrong for thinking this way," he asserted.

Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir said this in a satellite summit conference sponsored by the Asia Press Institute, which is now holding the Fourth One Asia Conference in Manila.

His authoritative and specific views on issues brought the first applause from businessmen, politicians, and newspaper editors who witnessed the broadcast at the Manila International Conference Center. He challenged a panel member who asked about the danger of mixing religion with civil government.

Besides Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who spoke from Angkasapuri, other Asian leaders also took part in the question-and-answer session. They were President Cory Aquino, who spoke from Malacanang Palace; Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto; South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young Hoon, who represented President Roh Tae Woo; and Indian Foreign Minister Inder Gujral, who represented Prime Minister V.P. Singh.

The hour-long program was led by veteran American correspondent Bernard Kalb.

He connected the leaders via satellite with a panel of Asian newspaper editors from India, Pakistan, Japan, and the Philippines at the Manila International Conference Center. The program was broadcast live to all of Asia and most of the world.

Emphasizing the view that the separation of government and religion is a Western idea, Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir said he chooses the Eastern interpretation of the matter.

"What you said more represents a genuine Western point of view. I believe in an Eastern viewpoint on public responsibility and on the ways we supervise our societies."

"Being different from the West certainly does not mean that we are wrong. An issue that we all face now is a comprehensive interpretation of society. Deciding right and wrong in this matter is too shackled by Western interpretation," he said in reply to a question by N. Ram, editor of the Indian THE HINDU.

In reply to another question on the involvement of religion in secular government, Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir declared that religion will naturally have an effect on state policies, because most people in Malaysia submit to the guidance of their religions.

Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir said the issue is how to control the views of extremist groups.

"It is up to us whether we listen to and are influenced by extremist views. In fact, there is no guarantee that we will avoid conflict even if we practice secular principles," the prime minister said.

Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir said he did not see why religion should not be considered in the politics of a country.

Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir again received a roar of applause when he presented his views on the meaning of democracy.

He said many people believe too strongly that genuine democracy will bring prosperity and justice. Democracy will be beneficial if the people themselves know the limits of democracy.

He feels that if people think that through democracy they can go into the streets to hold demonstrations and threaten people they do not like, such democracy will have no meaning.

"In our efforts to make democracy a reality, we must ask ourselves again what is the good of democracy. If we do not discipline ourselves, an authoritarian government will be certain to emerge anyway," he asserted.

Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir again referred to democracy when he was asked about the lessons we should learn as we enter the nineties.

He said Asian nations are able to be like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, but in order to accomplish that Asia needs political stability first.

"Some people think that overthrowing a government by demonstrations is democracy," said Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir.

Moderator Bernard Kalb interrupted by asking, "Then, are the events now occurring in East European Bloc not tremendous?"

Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir said they are indeed tremendous, because the people have overthrown dictatorial governments. What will happen, however, if the people continue to overthrow democratic governments at any time?

"If that happens, anarchy will result. Is that what we want?" he asked. Bernard Kalb asked whether we have other options.

"Yes, we have the option of studying in order to understand the limitations of the democracy we have shouted so much about. We must not misuse the freedoms of democracy. If we do, we will not see any more democracy in the world," he said as he received a roar of applause.

Mahathir Leadership Analyzed

90OG0142A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 25 Feb 90 p 6

[Article by Alias Mohamed: "Focus on Malay Political Crisis: Why Mahathir Leadership Is Controversial"]

[Text] Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamad is recognized today as an intellectual political leader. An examination of Dr Mahathir's leadership is essential to an understanding of the current dispute over Malay political leadership. His character as an intellectual should also be commented on.

An intellectual is a person who is oriented to ideas, knowledge, and social values.

Intellect is related to the part of man's brain that is critical, creative, and contemplative. It is the part that always tries to understand issues, analyzes, and seeks answers and solutions.

Intelligence is associated with the ability to understand, apply, and organize ideas and to adapt them to a person's objectives.

Intellect is associated with the ability to examine or investigate, to think or envision, to propose theories, and to criticize.

An intellectual, however, is a person who is considered to have capabilities even beyond these things. He has serious and critical interest in values, objectives, and goals beyond the merely practical.

MALAYSIA

An intellectual leader usually is very interested in giving strong emphasis to analytic and normative ideas and issues. This automatically makes him both a theorist and a moralist.

A society must therefore pay a certain price for the creation of intellectuals.

Because his ideas are often controversial and touch on what is happening around him, the intellectual naturally puts pressure on the society.

Tolerance for the presence of an intellectual is minimal in a society that possesses no traditions or intellectual culture.

A society that is feudal or finds it difficult to leave feudal influences considers an intellectual a threat to its system.

The exceptional opinions, theories, and values that the intellectual wants to disseminate are misunderstood as actions and conduct that are unrelated to his society.

They actually should not be seen as unrelated, however, because the objective of these theories, ideas, and values is the transformation of the society.

Because of opposition or the society's slow understanding of an intellectual's thoughts, the society only later sees the effect of the development and influence of his values.

Without being realized, these values may affect the thinking of the people and actions of politicians.

Actually, an intellectual political leader should not stand detached from his society, because he himself is a response to the desires of the people.

It is essential to understand this because of the close relationship that should exist between the people and the intellectual.

Society needs an intellectual to analyze its every issue and problem.

An intellectual also needs society to give significance to the growth and development of his thoughts.

Actually, it is hard to analyze and determine accurately why an intellectual has a critical attitude.

Social studies, however, point to conflicts in society as the reason why such a person grows up with a more rapid understanding of issues around him.

Active

That which perfects his intelligence and sharpness of mind, however, is his "committed" attention, wide reading, complete education, right acquaintances, and firm conviction about what he wants to prove or achieve in life.

All of these indicators appear to have existed in Dr Mahathir since his youth.

Even when he was a schoolboy, he was known as a smart student.

He wrote in college magazines on issues that were normally the themes of mature intellectuals.

His English was concise and effective. His message, too, was clear.

In fact, this capability expanded into sometimes controversial writing and reporting for English newspapers and local magazines.

Our picture of Dr Mahathir has been derived from writings that tell how he had a perfect process of growing up, probably a rare experience for most of us.

This also was probably not the experience of leaders who are not serious about their leadership or the problems of the people they lead.

Dr Mahathir clearly took complete advantage of his youth, without any harmful interference.

The atmosphere in his family was naturally one without rudeness and one that encouraged the children to grow up possessing complete confidence.

Of course, type and quality of leadership vary from one leader to another.

One factor that makes a difference is the process of growing up, as mentioned above.

Besides Dr Mahathir's political statements and views on various issues, his statements in "The Malay Dilemma" and in "Challenge" show that he is very committed to the ideas and issues that he promotes.

He not only presents ideas and theories, but he wants to see these ideas and issues become reality in a short period of time.

He appears to feel uncomfortable when a situation controls him.

He wants to control situations as an expert puppeteer closely controls his puppets.

Despite Dr Mahathir's affection for the bureaucracy, he appears to be the country's first leader who feels the bureaucracy cannot radically change the views of the people unless a political leader takes over leadership of changing people's minds.

Tun Razak once used that method, but Tun Razak himself was a product of the colonial bureaucracy. He led the bureaucracy by proxy through a directorate made up of advisers of his choice. Dr Mahathir probably did not consider this arrangement effective.

Where Tun Razak changed the bureaucracy institutionally, Dr Mahathir changed it structurally.

While Dr Mahathir led UMNO [United Malays National Organization] and the government in 1981, the bureaucratic weaknesses under the three prime ministers before him made him feel it necessary to act and to pioneer for himself a new bureaucratic direction, while at the same time not destroying the importance and dignity of the bureaucracy.

The first thing he did was to resolve the problem of values in public administration.

His closeness to the people made administration the most important mechanism in Dr Mahathir's efforts to transform the minds of the people.

Public administration itself is a symbol of power, influence, and responsibility for changing and improving the socioeconomics of the people. Therefore, he consistently planted in the minds of people in public administration values such as punctuality, honesty, diligence, cleanliness, dependability, effectiveness, commitment, responsibility, and industriousness without expecting pay.

Dr Mahathir is confident that the people's standard of living and future welfare will be hard to change as long as an agent of change like public service, which is so influential in the lives of the people, does not revolutionize its own mentality and organization.

Productivity and quality products in any form whatever must begin with a positive attitude toward life and work.

In the first 3 years of his administration, Dr Mahathir did not try to evade anything, nor did he seem to want to deviate from his primary ambition to transform the mentality of the people from the effects of colonial bondage and feudal system.

He made many statements indicating extraordinary interest in the issues of colonialism and the feudal system.

For Dr Mahathir, as long as colonial bondage and the feudal system are still a part of the people's values, their progress will face invisible opposition from within themselves.

Dr Mahathir's efforts to change public attitudes are a serious problem to groups in whom apathy, lethargy, and ineffectiveness—all parts of a system of the past—have become second nature.

Since 1969, groups that are termed conservative and have inherited the feudal attitude in the Malay community have considered Dr Mahathir a radical Malay figure with potential for threatening political equilibrium and stability.

His views on political power, feudal influences shackling Malays, foreign policy management, economic administration, the military, etc., were seen as threats to political leaders at that time.

For Dr Mahathir, the line between what Malays should keep and should not keep is so fine that he gives the impression that Malays will lose everything in the end.

The upheaval sparked by Dr Mahathir's book "The Malay Dilemma," published in 1970, further reinforced his opponents' belief that he was a potential threat to political stability and balance.

The strange thing about those people, however, was that they felt the writer of the ideas expressed in "The Malay Dilemma" was the one who would hurt balance and stability, rather than the political leaders who inherited "Faustian" values and wagered the fate of Malays for temporary riches and comfort.

Conservatives known as the perpetuators and protectors of the feudal system and colonial thinking were offended because under Dr Mahathir's administration and leadership style they would be isolated from obsolete practices.

They could not hope to be passengers, let alone drivers, without being hit by flak in the conflict of values caused by collision of the old and the new, the old-style and the modern, the conservative and the radical.

Their concern was that they would suddenly lose their power.

These conservative groups realized for the first time that Dr Mahathir's antifeudal, anticompromise, and anti-old-style, administration was strong and clear.

They were worried that in Malaysia's multicomunity society conflicts of values would escalate, which would cause them to be excluded from the decision-making process.

Consequently, many steps that Dr Mahathir took toward rejuvenation received strong opposition during the first 3 years of his government.

Not only political conservatives opposed him, but even some cabinet members were known to fear identification with Dr Mahathir's opinions and renewal measures.

The Malay monarchies were considered sacred institutions by the Malay community.

As in a feudal society, loyalty to the king and symbols of the monarchy was absolute.

To question or change the symbols of power were not only viewed as uncivilized, but not even one Malay since Munsyi Abdullah had been willing to associate himself with such an effort.

In the eras when kings held absolute rule, any action to question or change those in power, or even symbols of power, would have resulted in the death of the offender, and his house would have been dragged into the sea.

Unfortunately for Dr Mahathir, when in 1983 he tried to return the power of the monarchy to the people, meaning

Parliament, his action was viewed as an expression of republican sentiment and a perpetuation of Machiavellian practices.

Dr Mahathir was labeled as a dictator.

After 7 years of misunderstanding and suspicion, the group that clearly knows Dr Mahathir's true intentions still has not admitted that the problem was misunderstanding and suspicion.

The reluctance of this group to speak the truth is the real reason that Dr Mahathir's relations with the palaces are still strained.

Even until now, the attitudes of the palaces still reflect prejudice toward steps he has taken to eliminate unnecessary constitutional restrictions, although most of this prejudice has been lessened.

This is one evidence that the feudal mentality is hard to eliminate in a short period of time in a country where the system is still able to breathe through conflicts in society.

Dissensions and conflicts of values between Dr Mahathir and groups still unwilling to part with old styles did not end with UMNO demonstrations against attempts to return to the "greatness of the past."

For these groups, power has to be regained by methods that at least appear to be democratic and legal under the democratic system.

In 1986, the estrangement between Dr Mahathir and his deputy Datuk Musa Hitam created the awaited opportunity to present a case pictured as "public opposition" to a dictator's hand. It was very clear, however, that Datuk Musa, an intellectual himself, would lose his perspective in a conflict of values between the old system and the new one.

Datuk Musa appeared confident in 1986 that either he or Dr Mahathir must be sacrificed in the conflict of values and difference of opinion on how the country should be managed.

He chose to sacrifice himself.

This was the impression the public received when he made his statement on resigning his post as deputy prime minister, although history may give a different opinion.

Like Datuk Musa, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah feels that the conflict between old and new values may give Dr Mahathir the impression that the people would choose the old values.

Tengku Razaleigh's closest supporters are people considered to be heirs of the "old regime."

His defeat by Datuk Musa for the party's deputy presidency in 1981 and again in 1984 is often blamed on his failure to bring the vision of Malay intellectual leadership to realization in the eyes of his supporters.

During the time he was still influential, he did not take full advantage of his chances to build a second echelon Malay leadership, which is considered vital for facing the new challenges that are expected from non-Malay intellectuals.

Mandate

In view of the fact that the people gave a large mandate to Dr Mahathir's leadership in the 1986 general elections, the opinion is very wrong that says the people will choose the old style and thinking in any dispute over values.

Under radical Islamic leadership that was expected to control several states where internal UMNO dissension was especially acute, PAS [Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party] was surprised when even in "Islamic states," like Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, its influence was eroded by the power of people who took sides with Dr Mahathir.

The serious efforts of several UMNO leaders to overthrow the administration of Dr Mahathir came to a peak in 1987, when Tengku Razaleigh and Datuk Musa joined to oppose Dr Mahathir and Ghafar Baba.

Although defeated, Tengku Razaleigh apparently wanted to narrow his struggle by opposing UMNO and Dr Mahathir's leadership from the outside, a step now considered a mistake by Datuk Musa.

Datuk Musa appeared to make new calculations in order to face the possibility of a transfer of power and change of rules in UMNO politics in the next year or two.

Again looking back, two big incidents have struck UMNO under Dr Mahathir's leadership.

As I said before, the first incident was the "constitutional crisis" that occurred because of the old regime's interference in renewal efforts aimed at resolving problems of confusion at various levels among Malays and members of other communal groups.

The heart of all problems among Malays is their economic decline.

Dr Mahathir wants to resolve this problem quickly without getting, intentionally or not, the understanding of other groups which have been waiting for a chance to undo his renewal measures.

Armed with incomplete information and perceptions inherited from the "old school of thought," these groups quickly interpreted Dr Mahathir's steps toward modernizing the socioeconomic of the people as the attempts of a dictator to seize power from the Malay monarchies.

Those charges have proved to be slanderous.

As usual, his opponents are still evasive and decline to be candid, despite the fact that their charges have not been substantiated.

Nevertheless, the "constitutional crisis," which actually should not have been called a crisis, was a very useful lesson for Malays.

The crisis afforded a new understanding to the people that absolute power is in the hands of the people and not in the hands of kings.

To kings and princes the crisis gave an important signal, namely that the people will make something happen quickly if they want it to.

There is no king or prince in this country who can feel safe from the wishes and aspirations of the people.

If there should be a conflict of opinion between monarchs and the people, the loser is certain to be the system.

In 1983, UMNO leaders therefore gave the indirect signal that the people are the ones who determine power.

The signal was also clear that as long as kings and princes are protected by the people under a parliamentary system of democracy, the monarchies must not exceed traditional acts and conduct in a way that will offend public sensitivities.

The second big incident was the challenge of Dr Mahathir's leadership by Tengku Razaleigh and Datuk Musa in 1987.

Although that incident was merely a drop of poison in UMNO's glass, it left a useful lesson for the party, namely that Malays cannot betray the leadership of UMNO.

Malays will remain loyal to UMNO as long as the UMNO-led government does not tyrannize the people, does not appear unjust, and does not do things that can be interpreted as hurting Malay dignity.

In this country, history has shown repeatedly that Malays are not very interested in taking part in experiments that may cause Malays to lose political power, whether by default or unintentionally.

Interest in experimenting with new governments to replace UMNO is the intent and dream of only a few people.

Since 1946, many parties have emerged and then disappeared.

The only ones left are UMNO and PAS, and PAS has repeatedly been rejected by the people in eight general elections since 1955.

Malays rejected the Malay National Party of Malaya, led by Dr Burhanuddin and Ishak Haji Mohamad, although the ones who caused the party to collapse were the British.

More important in the banning of that party was the attitudes of Malays themselves, who lost confidence in any Malay political party which mixed its struggle with left-wing aspirations.

Malays also rejected the Malayan Independence Party and the State Party, led by Datuk Onn Jaafar, despite the fact that the party's leader had such dominant influence in UMNO as one of UMNO's founders.

If we want to learn from history, we must remember that history is not on our side merely because we are sure other people are wrong.

Samy Vellu Willing To Withdraw MIC From National Front

*90OG0140B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 20 Feb 90 p 2*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 19 Feb—Datuk Sri S. Samy Vellu said he is prepared to take the MIC [Malaysian Indian Congress] out of the National Front (BN) in the next elections if Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamad thinks someone else would be more qualified than the MIC.

The MIC president said he is prepared to take such action if the prime minister feels the three MIC leaders from the branches that were suspended are qualified to represent the Indian community and thus have the right to take the MIC's place in the BN.

"They may take this issue (the suspension of the branches) to the prime minister. If the prime minister wants to bring them into the BN to take the MIC's place, I will be happy and willing to withdraw," he said.

Datuk Sri Samy, who appeared angry as he talked about the suspended branches, spoke to reporters today after chairing a meeting of the MIC Central Working Committee (CWC) at the party's headquarters here.

He discussed charges that there are now 60,000 MIC members outside the party because of the suspension of the branches. The matter has been brought to the attention of Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir as chairman of the BN and prime minister.

Three leaders representing the suspended branches brought the question to the prime minister.

They are attorney V. Nadarajan, who formerly was treasurer for the Federal Territory MIC; M. Mathialagan, from Perak; and P. Muniandy, from Pulau Pinang.

Ghafar Baba Criticizes Spirit of '46

*90OG0141B Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 21 Feb 90 p 2*

[Text] Subang, 15 Feb—Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba said Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah made a big mistake when he formed the Spirit of '46, which has wrecked Malay unity.

"It's clear that the formation of the new party was a big mistake, but it's not too late for them to come back to UMNO [United Malays National Organization], for UMNO's door is still open," he said at a 65th birthday dinner held for him at the Hyatt Saujana last night.

He said UMNO will accept them for the sake of the future of Malays and not in competition for positions. He himself is willing to forget the insults made by the Spirit of '46.

Ghafar, who is also deputy president of UMNO, said that if the Spirit of '46 sincerely wants to rejuvenate UMNO, the proper step is not to create a new party but to join UMNO and submit appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly.

"When the General Assembly makes a decision, Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir must comply. Name a leader who dares to oppose a decision of the General Assembly," he said.

Ghafar said that further appeal to the Spirit of '46 is unnecessary and would be in vain. UMNO and the National Front (BN) will convince them in the upcoming general elections, however.

Minister

"Only by defeating them in the elections will Malays be reunited in UMNO. We have given the Spirit of '46 an open door to UMNO and even offered them a minister's post," he said.

According to Ghafar, the Spirit of '46 has no reason for making an issue of UMNO, whether the new one or the old one, for the important thing is not the date when UMNO was registered but the continuation of its struggle.

At the same time, he asked all UMNO members to strengthen the party by temporarily putting aside the issue of choosing positions. They should focus on preparations for the next elections.

He said the first effort to get attention should be a movement to register voters.

According to the UMNO deputy president, the number of UMNO members has increased from 1.3 million to 1.5 million, but some of them cannot vote. There are various reasons for this, including the fact that some of their names have been removed from voter lists.

"The Elections Commission will reopen voter lists. Therefore, forget for the present the matter of choosing leaders and give priority to the elections," he said.

He said that a battle cannot be avoided in the general elections but that UMNO will win if it is strong. It will be defeated, however, or come up short of votes if it is weak.

He said UMNO has identified districts where there is confusion and guarantees that the problems will be resolved.

He said further that the prime minister wants to see all the districts in good condition before thinking about holding elections.

Ghafar said the elections will be fierce this time, because the opposition parties are cooperating. He questioned the sincerity of PAS [Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party] and DAP [Democratic Action Party] in working with the Spirit of '46 to rejuvenate UMNO, for they used to hate UMNO.

Ghafar, who is also secretary-general of the BN, said the Spirit of '46 agreement with the opposition parties is an attempt to imitate the BN, but, unfortunately, the parties are too extreme.

Example

"It's not easy to have cooperation like that in the BN, because the BN is now a strong government on the right path. It has been successful in uniting all communal groups and in resolving a number of issues," he said.

He hopes the people will be aware of the BN's contributions and will realize that only the BN can maintain development for the people and the state.

Ghafar said he would not have expected the achievements that Malaysia has made in international politics nor the fact that Malaysia's imposition of the death penalty on drug traffickers would be an example to the industrialized countries.

Selangor Chief Minister Tan Sri Muhammad Haji Mohd. Taib, who represented UMNO from Selangor, the Federal Territory, and Negeri Sembilan at the dinner, said the prime minister and Ghafar should be given full support so that they can continue their leadership of the country.

He said he was proud of the brilliance Ghafar has demonstrated from the beginning until now.

The dinner meeting was sponsored jointly by the UMNO organizations of Selangor, the Federal Territory, and Negeri Sembilan.

DAP Leader Wants To Reduce National Front Majority

90OG0141A Kuala Lumpur WATAN in Malay

20 Feb 90 p 32

[Text] Pulau Pinang—Lim Kit Siang declared that a move toward a more democratic Malaysia can be made in the next general elections by eliminating the National Front's two-thirds majority.

The opposition leader in Parliament charged that because the Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir administration has a two-thirds majority in Parliament, it dares to commit various kinds of irregularities that are contrary to democratic practices.

"With control of a two-thirds majority, Dr Mahathir can do anything he pleases through Parliament," said Lim, who is also general secretary of DAP [Democratic Action Party].

He spoke at a DAP-Spirit of '46 lecture at the Sri Pinang Auditorium here. His was the first in the DAP-Spirit of '46 National Lecture series to be conducted in preparation for the elections.

He explained that the lecture series is an initial step toward eliminating the National Front's two-thirds majority in Parliament.

He called attention to the Tanjung II Project as an effort reflecting his determination to bring about change, not only in Pulau Pinang but throughout Malaysia.

"Its purpose is to give the Malaysian people a voice in their political, economic, cultural, educational, and social future," Lim said.

He ridiculed Dr Mahathir's administration for claiming that Malaysia should be recorded in the Guiness Book of World Records. "Actually, we still have very many weaknesses," Lim said.

Lim mentioned Minister of Information Datuk Mohamad Rahmat as a person who would like to put Malaysia in the Guiness Book of World Records. "At the same time, however, he doesn't realize that our country has too many scandals that could be recorded there."

Economists Comment on Value of Ringgit

90OG0140C Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 21 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 20 Feb—With the ringgit at its lowest level in history against the Singapore dollar, economists here have differing opinions about its effect on Malaysia.

They say that, whereas the strong Singapore dollar may increase import costs for Malaysia and cause "imported inflation," it may also prompt the relocation of certain industries from Singapore to this country.

Some feel that the ringgit's exchange rate is being controlled by the Central Bank in order to maintain the competitive advantage of Malaysian exports.

The ringgit's value, which remained between 1.37 and 1.41 against the Singapore dollar throughout last year, has risen steadily to 1.45 since the first of the year, and some people expect it will soon rise to the 1.50 ringgit level.

Although this is bad news for daily visitors from Johor who seek profit or pleasure in Singapore, what is the true effect on the Malaysian economy?

"We need not be too concerned about the decline of the ringgit's value against the Singapore dollar, because the

economic basis of the ringgit is still strong," said Tan Keok Yin, executive director of the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM).

Professor Fong Chan Onn of the University of Malaya believes, however, that the government should take seriously the decline of the ringgit against the Singapore dollar, because Singapore will remain Malaysia's principal trade partner in the years to come.

Tan told BERNAMA that the decline of the ringgit is only against the Singapore dollar and that the ringgit still maintains its value against the currencies of its main trading partners.

Moreover, the value of the Singapore dollar has risen not only against the ringgit but against other currencies as well. This is a result of factors within Singapore and not of developments in Malaysia, he said.

An economist with a foreign bank here said that the government is more concerned about the movement of the ringgit against the yen and the U.S. dollar, for most of Malaysia's foreign trade is transacted in U.S. dollars and its debts are calculated in both of these currencies.

Therefore, any big change in the values of these two currencies will have great effect on the country's trade and debt positions.

The reason the Central Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market to maintain the value of the ringgit was to avoid any bad effect on the economy, said the economist, who did not want to be identified.

He is among the economists who feel that the value of the ringgit will exceed 1.50 ringgit to the Singapore dollar and predicts that this level will be reached before the end of the year.

Professor Fong, who is also head of the Applied Economics Department in the Faculty of Economics and Management at the University of Malaya, added that, from the long-range aspect, the Singapore dollar is strong because the republic's rapid industrialization, modernization, and development have made it a foremost financial center, supported by an encouraging rate of economic growth.

He said that about 75 percent of Peninsular Malaysia's trade is conducted via Singapore and that Malaysia should expand direct trade relations with its trading partners by continuing to improve its shipping.

Efforts to upgrade local ports like Pasir Gudang, Klang, and Pulau Pinang should be pursued aggressively in order to reduce the negative effect of the rising Singapore dollar on the Malaysian economy.

Professor Fong said the Singapore dollar's strong value has made it attractive for Singapore companies with labor-intensive operations, like textiles and assembly of electronics, to relocate to Malaysia, particularly to nearby Johor.—BERNAMA

Official Comments on Ramifications of Bases

*42000047A Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English
21 Feb 90 p 7*

[Article By Marcial R. Pimentel, former governor and minister of State for Foreign Affairs]

[Text] The way things are developing in our country today, it seems that the Philippine government will ultimately terminate the American presence at Clark and Subic.

The sentiments inclined to dismantling the bases were first clearly expressed by a majority of our Senators and, like a contagious disease, the virus has affected the House of Representatives where the voice of opposition against this American preserve is heard louder and louder with the passing of each day.

To compound matters, Mrs. Aquino surprised George Bush and all America when she dared snub Defense Secretary Richard Cheney—a posture never before taken by a Philippine President where an American high-ranking official is concerned. As Max Soliven asserted in his February 19 column, datelined New York, “the common impression among the Yankees is that those U.S. Air Force phantom jets saved President Aquino from being overthrown by the December military rebels. And they cannot understand why, by turning a cold shoulder on Cheney, our President expressed her “thanks” in a very strange way.” Soliven continued: “Our slogan in the Philippines is Yankees go home, but leave dollars.”

At this early stage, it is perhaps safe to perceive that prior to the fall of 1990, the Philippine government will make a pronouncement announcing to the whole world that the largest U.S. bases outside the continental America will be closed down in the Philippines.

We would like to underline the truth that this writer is not an advocate of bases retention. But we are seriously skeptical if dismantling of those U.S. fortifications could ever be implemented upon Philippine behest. That is easier said than done. It is our considered opinion that it could be effected only if America feels that it is in her interest to leave, but not otherwise.

For instance, if in view of the ongoing radical changes in the political temperament of Moscow and her satellites in Eastern Europe, America's judgment is that it is no longer necessary to maintain her various bases around the world which is bleeding her white economically, then the U.S. will close down Clark and Subic without any prodding from us. In that event, no amount of Filipino pleadings for them to stay will keep them from leaving.

On the other hand, for as long as the United States needs the bases in our area, they will linger and hold on, regardless of any pronunciamientos from the Philippine government.

The situation is similar to an unarmed 140 pounder man ordering a 200 pounder with pistols on either side of his hip to vacate a chair which the little man claims as his own. What recourse is there for the little man if the big hulk refuses to move? We suppose that the 140 pounder would simply look the other way.

Of course, for international consumption, America will announce that she will leave our country in acquiescence to our government's fiat. However, we anticipate that the U.S. will request for at least five years to strip out her citadel. She will advance two reasons: First, dismantling and hauling billions of dollars worth of military hardware cannot be achieved on short notice; second, she has to scout around for another country willing to accommodate a mountain of materials and equipment which have accumulated at Subic and Clark through the years.

We sadly foresee that five years shall have elapsed and the Yanks would still be with us. If reminded that the period extended to them within which to move out has expired, they could easily respond that “we are still looking around for a proper and strategic location where to effect the transfer. The areas we found have been rejected by our military strategists.” In such an eventuality, has our government envisioned out effective steps to enforce its decree?

Ramos Defends Effectiveness of PMA

*42000047B Manila MANILA CHRONICLE in English
18 Feb 90 p 4*

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos yesterday said the “majesty” of the Philippine Military Academy [PMA], the country's premier military school, is being threatened by wrong public perception that it has become a breeding ground for coup plotters and military rebels.

On the contrary, PMA alumni are the defenders of constitutional democracy, he said in a speech during the PMA alumni day celebration.

“It is with the same spirit of constitutionalism that our forefathers fought and died to liberate our people from oppression and colonial bondage,” he said.

Ramos cited the crucial role of the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] chief of staff, the commanders of the four major AFP services—Army, Air Force, Navy and Constabulary—and the field commanders, as well as the civilian government, in uniting the “fractious AFP.”

“The intensification of unity and teamwork that must exist between the civilian government and the military are essential to national stability, security and growth,” he said.

He added: “Unity within the armed forces is meaningless unless it is anchored on the paramount requisites of loyalty to the Constitution and service to the people.”

"Mere loyalty to class, alma mater and profession must always give way to the higher interest of nation and people," Ramos said.

APC Maj. Simeon Dizon, intelligence officer of Central Luzon PC Command based in Camp Olivas, Pampanga, yesterday told the Davide Commission that rebel soldiers had been recruiting soldiers from Recomm-3 since August last year.

He, however, said their recruitment failed since the soldiers under the command remained loyal to the Government. This has been proven during the December coup when not a single soldier from Camp Olivas participated.

Dizon said he had submitted a report on the recruitment as well as other intelligence information on the coup plan, including its scheduled launching between Nov. 27 and Dec. 1, to Recom chief Brig. Gen. Cesar Nazareno.

Nazareno failed to appear in yesterday's hearing because of an important conference in Baguio City.

Another witness, Lt. Col. Efren Fernandez, provincial commander of Pampanga, recounted his encounter with some 300 soldiers from the 56th Infantry Battalion who tried to pass the Arayat Bridge in the afternoon of Dec. 3.

Fernandez identified the leaders of the rebel troops as his former PMA classmate Lt. Col. Zamora.

Abenina's 'Socialism'

42000048B Manila NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English
14 Feb 90 p 21

[Article by Francisco Nemenzo, DAILY GLOBE]

[Text] Abenina's program is a masterpiece in ambiguity. When he says that "business establishments should be oriented toward nationalism and socialism," I am not sure he knows what he is talking about. He evades the issue of who will own and control these "business establishments." Yet, for real socialists, this is the central issue. If "business establishments" will remain in private hands, the emerging social system will be capitalist rather than socialist for the essence of socialism is the social ownership and control of the means of social production, distribution and exchange.

What Abenina has in mind perhaps is the "socialism" Don Enrique Zobel advocated a decade ago. I remember Dean Froilan Bacungan of the UP College of Law lending me a copy of Zobel's pamphlet. I sent it back with this note written in proper bureaucratic form: "Respectfully returned to the dean, College of Law, the pamphlet of Don Enrique Zobel de Ayala which provides new evidence for the old dictum that wealth and intelligence do not mix."

Abenina unintentionally gives a clue to his political thought by citing Kemal Ataturk as his model. Ataturk

was not a socialist and never claimed to be. He attained immortality as the modernizer of Turkey by superimposing capitalist institutions upon one of the most backward feudal systems in Europe. Like Abenina, Ataturk was a general; unlike Abenina, he succeeded the first time he staged a coup.

The term "socialism" has been appropriated by political swindlers to dignify their evil schemes. Adolf Hitler called his band of hooligans the "National Socialist German Workers' Party" (Nazi). In reality, the Nazi party was the chief instrument of Germany's big capitalists to disperse the powerful trade union movement and to crush all progressive organizations.

Until a popular uprising forced them to rename it, the ruling junta in Burma sported the title of "Socialist Program Party." But if Karl Marx was reincarnated as a Burmese, he would have opposed it with characteristic vigor. The "socialism" which Burma's soldier-politicians installed upon seizing power by a coup placed all "nationalized industries" under the mis-management of colonels and generals.

That is not socialism but praetorian capitalism.

Rereading my note to Dean Bacungan, I detected the Left sectarianism which dominated my political thinking in those days. Its sweeping generalization could not explain the phenomenon of Friedrich Engels who combined wealth with intelligence and social conscience. Of course, Zobel is no Engels!

The Left sectarians of today will automatically dismiss the slightest possibility of the military becoming a progressive force. This, too, cannot explain events in the recent past. As of Torrijismo, Panama's anti-imperialist movement. In many countries of Africa and some in Latin America and the Middle East, the military spearheads the struggle for socio-economic reforms. The officers corps of the Portuguese army was mainly responsible for dismantling the Salazar dictatorship. As a matter of fact, the Portuguese soldiers who fought the colonial wars in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (having received their political education from their black enemies) returned to Lisbon as staunch exponents of a socialist revolution.

I am not suggesting that RAM is a progressive force. All indications are that it represents the extreme Right in the Philippine ideological spectrum. But we cannot exclude the possibility that in the course of striving for their nebulous "ideals" they will deepen their political understanding. How could they miss the lesson of December 1? If they have any sense at all, they should realize by now that foreign military bases expose our country to the constant danger of U.S. imperialist intervention.

The RAMboys should not let their hatred for Cory blur the meaning of the February 1986 revolution. Gringo Honasan himself, soon after that exhilarating experience, pledged that "never again" would the military be isolated from the people. His misfortune began once he

forgot this lesson and reverted back to the arrogant militaristic idea that men with guns can act apart from the people.

Yes, they can shoot their way to Malacanang. But they should reflect upon this question: Can they hold power against a militant citizenry? Faced with popular resistance, they will have to keep on killing and killing. Such atrocities are precisely what will rouse the whole nation, as happened to Marcos. They will not even get a chance to enforce their nebulous program of reforms.

For as long as 2,000 rebel soldiers remain underground, the government's boast that "everything is under control" sounds hollow. It is extremely costly and difficult to keep such a large force. It is therefore safe to guess that the RAMboys are planning another mischief in the near future. (Whether they will succeed is something else).

Government intelligence does not know the extent of their influence among the combat-effective units whose PMA [Philippine Military Academy]-educated commanders are now feigning loyalty to constitutional authority. We should not underestimate the fraternities that hold them together. Alma mater chauvinism plus the sense of solidarity evolved in the field of battle are the best ingredients for conspiracy.

I think the government is foolish to offer fabulous rewards for the capture of Gringo, et al. It is not beyond those rascals to arrange the "capture" of some expendable comrades to help finance their next adventure. After all, the Aquino government is too scared to impose draconian penalties. When presented to the press, the "captured" RAMboys get a marvelous opportunity to engage in a propaganda.

The inconvenience of being detained is now worse than the inconvenience of living underground. While in detention, they can always walk out whenever they wish. If what General Aguirre termed the "Comilang syndrome" worked for high-ranking communist leaders, imagine how easy it would be for the RAMboys to obtain special privileges from guards who continue to regard them as superior officers.

While in hiding, communication with their comrades in active service must be a great problem. But if some of them get detained, coordination is immensely facilitated. Their comrades can visit them without arousing suspicion and messages can be transmitted through members of their families.

For these "captured" plotters, the risks are minimal for the same Constitution which they are sworn to destroy protects them from capital punishment. Even if convicted for "conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman," they do not expect to stay long behind bars. The promise of an impending coup keeps alive their faith in early deliverance.

Two Europeans Held for Suspected Rebel Activities

HK0503085790 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 5 Mar 90 pp 1, 12

[Excerpt] Two Europeans and a peasant leader were picked up for questioning Thursday afternoon while they were taking photographs of the camp of the 52nd Infantry Battalion, six kilometers from Calbayog City.

In other developments:

An Army Patrol last Wednesday stumbled upon a shallow grave containing the bodies of 26 suspected New People's Army guerillas killed during a recent rebel raid on Arteche, Eastern Samar.

Two policemen, two rebels and a militiaman were killed while eight others were wounded Friday night during NPA [New People's Army] attacks in three Bataan towns.

The two Europeans identified themselves as Hans-Hoachim Sciefebein y Pfeifer, 39, a German, and Henorius Johannes de Kok y Gerardus, a Dutch, during a tactical interrogation at the 8th Army Division camp at Catbalogan, Samar.

Col. Nestor Castillo, chief of staff of the 8th Army Division, said the German and Dutch embassies in Manila confirmed the identities of the two Europeans.

A college graduate, Sciefebein had been staying at Barangay Hiratag, San Jose, Northern Samar, for six months. De Kok works at the Dutch embassy as project coordinator on development cooperation.

Greg Sarmiento, secretary of a peasant organization in Samar, was also taken in for questioning. Sarmiento, who escorted the two foreigners, is the brother of a rebel commander operating in Northern Samar, Castillo said.

Castillo gave no details of the results of the interrogation. The military has been saying that certain foreigners are supporting local insurgents.

The military yesterday turned over the three to Samar Gov. Antonio Bolastig.

In another development, Castillo said yesterday the Army last Wednesday found the bodies of 26 suspected communist rebels buried in a shallow grave 13 kilometers north of Arteche, Eastern Samar.

Castillo said communist rebels could have hastily buried in teh shallow grave their fallen comrades who were killed during the raid on Arteche on Feb. 19.

Castillo said 18 rebels, an Army machinegunner and two militiamen were killed when a 300-man rebel group swooped down on Arteche. Seven others, including a still unidentified Caucasian, were wounded.

Castillo said soldiers of the 14th Infantry Battalion dug up the bodies—all males—after a skirmish with rebels. Two rebels were reported killed while two soldiers were wounded in the encounter.

The military recovered two M-16 rifles, a typewriter and subversive documents at a nearby rebel camp. [passage omitted]

Negros NPA Rebels Plan To Surrender

42000047C Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English
19 Feb 90 p 14

[Text] A New People's Army (NPA) surrenderee from Negros Occidental said yesterday many of his companions in the province are planning to surrender to avail themselves of the government's amnesty program.

This was revealed by Reynaldo Estario, alias "Ka Romel," who surrendered to the PC Capital Regional

Command-North Sector Command (NSC), Estario was a member of the movement in barangay Patag, Silay City, for two years.

Many of his companions, he said, are serious about the government's program and had long wanted to reform because the movement in the province had lost the people's support.

Estario said many believe that joining the movement will not do them any good.

Accompanied by his brother-in-law, Ben Selga, Estario said he decided to give up his position to take advantage of the government's granting of amnesty to the communist surrenderees.

Estario said he is in Manila to hide from his companions who might harm him as a result of the surrender.

Since 1987, Estario said he has been a member of the NPA's political organization team which seeks to convince the people in the community that joining the NPA will mean a better life for them and the rest of the country.

Compromise Possible in Textile Talks With U.S.

BK0903013390 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 9 Mar 90 p 15

[Text] Thailand may compromise with the United States on a possible new textile agreement during informal talks in Geneva next week.

Thai Garment Manufacturers' Association president Wirot Amattakunchai said a Thai delegation, led by Foreign Trade Department Director-General Oranut Osathanon, would informally talk with the U.S. counterpart on various possibilities to clear the way for future talks on a new textile agreement to replace one which expired in December, 1988.

Nevertheless, he insisted the Thai private sector could not accept the U.S. proposal to impose aggregate quotas, or caps, on top of individual textile quotas.

Medical, Food Aid to Romania

90OG0133D Bangkok NAEON in Thai 4 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] The Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that as a result of the political unrest in Romania, many people have been injured or killed. The Romanian embassy in Thailand has asked the Thai government to provide humanitarian aid. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will provide 150,000 baht worth of medical supplies and 150,000 baht worth of canned food.

The money for this has come from the ministry's budget for the 1990 Joint Program To Provide Food Aid. The ministries of commerce and public health have provided assistance in obtaining and sending this aid to Romania.

"This aid will be turned over on 5 February at 1000 hours in the Theowong Room at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. MR [royal title] Thep Theokun, the deputy under secretary, will turn over this aid to an embassy representative.

Chatchai Relationship With Manun, Chawalit Reaction

90OG0133B Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 12-18 Feb 90 pp 35-37

[Excerpts] The upgrading of positions and reshuffle of general officers was announced by the king on 5 February. That is, the deputy under secretary of defense positions of all three people were upgraded to field marshal rank. [passage omitted]

One person considered to be very lucky is Maj. Gen. Thawat Ket-angkun, a member of CRMA [Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy] Class 12, who holds the position of deputy director of the Defense Policy and Planning Office. When the position of director was upgraded to a full general's slot, Maj. Gen. Thawat retained his position as deputy director but was promoted to lieutenant general, the new rank for this slot. He is the first member of CRMA Class 12 to reach the

rank of lieutenant general. Maj. Gen. Decha Phisitkasem and Rear Admiral Chamnan Khongsuwan were both transferred to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense in order to open up two major-general slots for Col. Saiwawit Senanarong and Col. Manun Rupkhachon, who have been promoted to major general and assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. One new major-general slot was opened in the Defense Policy and Planning Office, that is, the position of assistant director. Navy Captain Samran Phoncharoen-suk, who has been promoted to rear admiral, is the first person to serve in this new position. [passage omitted]

In this military reshuffle and upgrading of slots, people have been more interested in the major general slots than in the field marshal or general slots. That is because Col. Manun Rupkhachon, a Young Turk and the leader of two coup attempts, was promoted to major general and assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. After being discharged, he was later granted amnesty. Col. Manun left government service following the events of 1 April 1980 and was not reinstated until the beginning of last year. There has been much talk in military circles about the case of Col. Manun. He has been the target of much criticism. There have been reports that it was Gen. Chatchai Chunhawan, the prime minister and minister of defense, who took steps to have Col. Manun promoted to "general." There have been rumors that he will be appointed aide to the minister of defense. But in fact, Col. Manun will serve as a staff officer attached to the minister of defense, because Air Vice Marshal Damrong Binsi still holds the position of aide to the minister of defense.

There have been reports that the army and Supreme Command Headquarters were unaware that Col. Manun would be promoted to major general. This matter was handled by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. Gen. Wanchai Ruangtrakun, the under secretary of defense, received a direct order from Gen. Chatchai about this. A news source said that "they had the right to do this, because there was a slot open. Neither the army nor Supreme Command Headquarters knew anything about this, because that slot was in the Office of the Under Secretary. He will get that pay rate, because when he was discharged, he was already a special colonel. There was an open slot and so he was appointed to that position. The reason why there has been so much talk is that he is near Prime Minister Chatchai. It looks as if this is some sort of a game involving politics."

Our news source said that several other Young Turks who belonged to CRMA Class 7 and who participated in the 1 April coup attempt have been reinstated in the army and promoted to general. Thus, there is nothing strange about the fact that Col. Manun has been promoted to general. But because politics is involved, people are paying close attention to this.

As for the relationship between Col. Manun and Gen. Chatchai, a high-level new source said that their relationship is not very deep. When Gen. Chatchai was deputy

commandant of the Armored Cavalry School, Col. Manun was still a junior officer. However, both Gen. Chatchai and Col. Manun are cavalry officers, as is Gen. Wanchai Ruangtrakun, the under secretary of defense. His promotion to general and assignment to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense was quite rapid.

Our news source said that 1 month ago, very secret action was taken in the case of Col. Manun. In military circles, it is known that Chatchai pulled this Young Turk close to him on 3 January 1990. LAK THAI was informed that on 4 January, which was "Cavalry Day," Gen. Chatchai attended the ceremony at the Adison Camp, Saraburi Cavalry Center. On the evening of 3 January, Gen. Chatchai asked Col. Manun to come see him at his house on Ratchakhruek Lane. They had been in contact several days prior to that. Gen. Chatchai told Col. Manun that he wanted him to accompany him to Saraburi the next morning aboard a helicopter. He also asked him to come stay with him. Col. Manun has been working with him closely on an unofficial basis ever since then, that is, since the evening of 3 January.

Our news source said that Cavalry Day at Saraburi was an important turning point. Because on 3 January, Gen. Chawalit Yongchayut sent a message from the Office of the Supreme Commander to Maj. Gen. Yutthaphan Mokaramani, the commander of the Cavalry Center, stating that he would not attend the ceremony and that Gen. Suchinda Kraprayun, the deputy RTA CINC, would attend in his place. But that evening, that is, on the evening that Gen. Chatchai asked Col. Manun to come see him and asked him to come stay with him, another message was sent to the Cavalry Center stating that Gen. Chawalit Yongchayut would attend the ceremony after all.

A high-level news source told LAK THAI that the fact that Gen. Chawalit changed his mind about having Gen. Suchinda attend the ceremony in his place is very interesting. But another way of looking at this is that he did this in order to prevent any misunderstanding. Our news source said that Gen. Chawalit learned on the evening of 3 January that Gen. Chatchai had asked Col. Manun to stay close to him.

It is worth noting that at the Cavalry Day ceremony at Saraburi, soldiers were told to wear "light uniforms." The cavalrymen did not wear their black berets. But Gen. Chatchai wore camouflage fatigues and the black beret of a cavalryman. He had probably told Col. Manun to wear the same uniform, because Col. Manun wore camouflage fatigues and a black beret, too. The news source said that during the helicopter ride to Saraburi and back from the helicopter pad at the 2d Cavalry Division, Gen. Chatchai was very lively and told Col. Manun to "come and stay with me." When Gen. Chatchai arrived at the artillery and tank training field of the Cavalry Center, about a hundred senior officers were on hand to welcome him. When they arrived there, Gen. Chatchai got out of the first car and Col. Manun got out of the second. People asked why Col. Manun had come

with Gen. Chatchai, but the answers were not very clear because this news had not yet spread very far.

That day, when Gen. Chawalit went to greet Gen. Chatchai when his helicopter landed, Col. Manun saluted Gen. Chawalit. Gen. Chawalit patted him on the arm and said: "It's good to see you. Let's work together."

Suchinda Discusses Political, Military, Foreign Policy

90OG0132A Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai 4 Feb 90
pp 28-37

[Exclusive interview with Gen. Suchinda Kraprayun, deputy RTA CINC and CRMA Class 5 president, on 24 Jan 90 by Samran Rotphet, Wuthiphong Lakkham, and Kritiya Phoratsami; place not specified]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Duties After Being Announced As the "Heir" to the Position of RTA CINC

[KHAO PHISET] After Gen. Chawalit Yongchayut, the RTA CINC, announced that you were being made "heir" to the position of RTA CINC, did he assign you any special duties?

[Suchinda] Actually, even before he made that announcement, he had been trying to assign whatever tasks he could to me. This has been the case ever since I was promoted to deputy RTA CINC. For example, on 24 January Television Channel 5 invited him to preside at the ceremony commemorating the establishment of this television channel. He asked me to go in his place. When he is asked to preside at some event, he often asks me to go in his place. Sometimes I decline to go. One example is the function at the Artillery Center in Lopburi. I declined because he had not attended that function for several years. This is usually scheduled for the same time as the ceremony to commemorate the establishment of the Internal Security Operations Command. But this year, the two functions were not scheduled at the same time. As an artilleryman, I urged him to go and he did.

In short, he does not want to attend functions unless it is necessary. In some cases, he asks the army chief of staff or the first or second assistant RTA CINC to go in his place depending on the function.

[KHAO PHISET] Was the Harab Panbaru Program in the south assigned to you directly?

[Suchinda] That was not a special assignment, because I am the deputy RTA CINC. That had been assigned to others before me. When Gen. Wanchai (Gen. Wanchai Ruangtrakun, the under secretary of defense and former deputy RTA CINC) was the deputy RTA CINC, he was responsible for this program. Thus, when he left this position, he turned it over to me.

Actually, he has not assigned me many special tasks. That is, he has not assigned me any more such tasks than he did Gen. Wanchai when he was deputy RTA CINC. There is nothing unusual about this. [passage omitted]

On the Military in the High Tech Age and the Transfer of Military Units Out of Bangkok

[KHAO PHISET] After Gen. Chawalit became RTA CINC, he announced that he would try to develop the army by making it smaller but more efficient, or "small but excellent" as some have said. As a senior army officer, can you tell us how much has been done based on this concept? [passage omitted]

[Suchinda] Having a smaller army does not mean that our nation's defenses will be weaker. The standing army may be smaller, but we will have a reserve forces system. We will be able to call up the reserves whenever the need arises. We must have an army, but there are many complications. We don't need a huge army, but we must have equipment and tools. The number of personnel on active duty may decline, but we must have weapons and equipment on hand just like in Israel. They can call up an entire division in just 2 hours. Thus, even though the standing army will be smaller, our objective is to have a system like that.

[KHAO PHISET] By what percentage has our standing army been reduced?

[Suchinda] We are trying to reduce the size of the army as much as possible. But this must be done gradually. We have tried to use volunteers in place of regular soldiers, but this has not achieved good results. That's because no one wants to be a soldier today. The pay is very low. And as our country industrializes and becomes a NIC [newly industrialized country], fewer and fewer people want to serve in the military. That's because they can earn much more in the civilian sector. The military and Gen. Chawalit are very concerned about this. People attend the military academy for 5 years, just as long as university students, but when they graduate, they receive only 3,000 baht a month. But a technology graduate is paid more than 10,000 baht a month. Who will want to join the military? We are very concerned about this. [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] When the RTA CINC announced that you would succeed him as RTA CINC, at one point he talked about the army's budget, saying that he had already spent 30 billion baht. He said that before he leaves the military, he wants to find 10 billion baht in budget funds for the next RTA CINC. Can you tell us anything about this?

[Suchinda] The policy of the RTA CINC is to transfer military units out of Bangkok Metropolitan and base them in the provinces. He plans to use some of the money obtained from land fees to procure weapons and other equipment for the army. The rest will be used to build up the units that have been transferred. Take the 2d Cavalry Division at the Pao Camp, for example. I don't know the price but suppose that businessmen pay 30 billion baht. He might use only 10 billion to build a new base. The other 20 billion can then be used to build up the army without having to ask the government for more money. The people won't have to pay more taxes to

build up the army. That is his objective. This is the program that we are implementing. [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] Can it be said that positions, field and general grade positions, will be inflated?

[Suchinda] I don't think so, because this is necessary. As I have said, in view of the fact that salaries in the private sector or business sector are so high, the public sector has to do something. Things must be expanded. Otherwise, we won't be able to advance. There will be a "brain drain." There is no other way for us to attract people. We have to make military positions comparable to those in other sectors. The military is under many restrictions. This is universal with respect to the matter of rank. We cannot add any more than this. We must try to make things comparable to other sectors. The important thing is to develop and improve things, particularly manpower, in accord with today's mission, which is much more complex than in the past. Thus, today's army must be improved in terms of both manpower and ranks in line with the "high tech" age and the military's mission in developing the country. [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] Are there any plans to establish new divisions in fiscal 1990?

[Suchinda] No. We will probably focus on improving things in the existing units. Some units are still below strength or have only 15-20 percent of the weapons and equipment that they are supposed to have.

[KHAO PHISET] Have you ever considered how much it would cost to develop the army in all respects, including manpower, weapons, and so on?

[Suchinda] Let's put it this way. We don't have to have everything. But we must ensure that the standards are met. Suppose, for example, that ammunition is needed to last 10-20 days. That would cost at least 50 billion baht. It wouldn't be necessary to purchase additional weapons. All we need is enough ammunition to be able to fight for 7, 10, or 15 days.

[KHAO PHISET] Do you think that enough money has been allotted to the military?

[Suchinda] There is no country in the world that gives the military the full amount requested. That is not possible. Because in defending the country.... The border is very long. To defend the country well, it would take 20 divisions. No country in the world maintains a huge standing army in peacetime. Thus, there must be good systems, including a system for calling up men, a system for having reserve forces and stockpiling weapons, and other systems.

"66/23 Has Progressed Well, the Only Thing Is...."

[KHAO PHISET] As for the internal security problem, particularly the communist problem, now that the military and government have achieved good results in the struggle against the communists and things are fairly peaceful in the

jungles, some people fear that they may carry on activities in the cities. What do you think about this?

[Suchinda] I have not studied this matter very much. But concerning the lessons taught by experts, I remember one of the lessons taught by MR [royal title] Yongsuk Kamalat when I attended the staff officers school. At that time, he was with the Special Branch Police. He had graduated from Chulalongkorn University and had been a well-known actor. He was very handsome. He played both rugby and soccer and was just as famous as well-known players of today. During the lecture, he said that the communists would never have a change of heart. He said that he had monitored some people ever since they had been students. Even after returning from abroad, they still had the same ideas as before. Only their tactics had changed. He was referring to those who adhered to certain ideals, not to those who had been forced into this or become involved out of necessity. The latter type are another matter. [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] Order 66/23 has proven to be very effective against the communists. Order 66/23 states that the ultimate objective is to establish a perfect democracy with the king at the head. That will represent the final defeat of the communists. But today's reality is different from this policy, because obstacles have been encountered. What is your view on this?

[Suchinda] I think that Order 66/23 has been very successful. The only KHAO PHISET is which units should be responsible for the various tasks in each stage. During one period, military units that were a main component of the ISOC [Internal Security Operations Command] played a major role. But if the military continues to carry out everything, people may wonder, why does the military have to become involved in everything? [passage omitted]

Government Security—"If You Do Good, You Will Get Good; If You Do Bad, You Will Get Bad"

[KHAO PHISET] In our democratic system, do you think that there is political stability, and how stable is the government?

[Suchinda] Actually, as a soldier, I am not very interested in that sort of thing. But from reading the newspaper, it doesn't seem that the coalition government is very secure. Every country, including Japan, needs to improve things and make changes. In Thailand, if we continue to have coalition governments, the government will not remain unchanged during its 4-year term. That doesn't mean that it won't survive. It just means that it will have to make changes. That is natural for political parties in a coalition government, right? From what I have observed, every country is like this. We can't avoid this.

[KHAO PHISET] The present government comes under that law. In your view, how secure is the present government?

[Suchinda] I don't know. I look at things like an outsider. I can't see any signs of instability. But there may be certain things. Otherwise, the prime minister probably wouldn't have changed ministers, right? I look at things from the perspective of an outsider. But as outsiders, we don't know what is actually happening. I am not interested in politics. But changes were made and so there must have been reasons for those changes.

[KHAO PHISET] Which do you think is more suitable for political development in our country: reducing the number of political parties and having only two or three large parties or having a large number of political parties?

[Suchinda] To be honest, I have not studied that issue. But I don't think that the present political system is right. I think that the present turmoil stems from the fact that MPs all want to be ministers. The constitution allows MPs to serve as ministers. This is the main cause of the turmoil. Also, there are different ways to become minister. In some cases, people who control a large number of MPs or who have much money are appointed minister. Some parties choose people based on the number of terms that they have served in parliament. If they aren't appointed during their first, second, or third term, they are appointed their fourth term. But the main thing is to select qualified people whom the people respect.

[KHAO PHISET] You mean that it isn't necessary to choose people who have been MPs for many terms. The important thing is that they be knowledgeable and capable people, right?

[Suchinda] Whether they are an MP or not isn't important. But they must be acceptable to the people or society. [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] What type of person should the next prime minister be, or what characteristics should he have?

[Suchinda] I think that honesty is the most important quality. He must be honest and fair. He must be able to coordinate interests. He must be someone who can compromise and who can induce others to cooperate with him. But the most important quality is honesty. If the prime minister is honest, that will help prevent others from engaging in dishonest activities.

[KHAO PHISET] Have you had a chance to meet and chat with Prime Minister Chatchai?

[Suchinda] I have known him for a long time. We used to go out together. We used to be "playboys."

[KHAO PHISET] Recently, the RTA CINC has talked a lot about corruption. What do you think should be done about this?

[Suchinda] Corruption is a problem that is difficult to solve, particularly in Thai, Chinese society. This is because Chinese view corruption as a way of buying convenience. This is common for Chinese everywhere. I have seen this in the United States and among American

policemen. I have seen this in Chinatown. The police sit in shops owned by Chinese and drink for free. Because the Chinese like to buy convenience. A Westerner would not put up with this. This is a major problem. Such common acts of corruption aren't that important. It's the unusual acts of corruption that are worrisome. But what can be done? [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] If Gen. Chawalit decides to serve the country in a political capacity, do you think that he should form a party or what?

[Suchinda] That is up to him. I don't know. I think that there are two ways to view politics. Those who form a political party are rarely successful. Look at Gen. Kriangsak, for example. He was a senior military officer who made excellent political preparations. He held various positions and formed a party. Gen. Athit formed a party, a small party. Gen. Thianchai, the former deputy RTA CINC, formed a party, too, but it hasn't grown at all. It's difficult to play politics in our country. The question is how to get high-quality people into our democratic system. I think that this is very difficult. No matter how qualified you are, if you don't have money, you won't stand a chance of being elected. [passage omitted]

Things haven't changed. Prime Minister Chatchai has told me: "Do you know? Even if I do a good job, I couldn't win an election without money." Khukrit has told me that when he was prime minister, he had to take his "purse" and get money from the ISOC. He said that he still hasn't paid off his debts. You can write whatever you wish. But he said that. He admitted that. He told me that he had to spend a lot of money on the election. The question is, how do we solve this problem?

[KHAO PHISET] How great a role will the military play in solving this problem, and what role can it play?

[Suchinda] First, it can play a role with respect to money, and second, it can play a role with respect to the influence of local godfathers. MPs have asked the military if it could provide help during elections to prevent these people from interfering or gaining influence. The military has Santi Nimit units and radio and television stations to help keep the people informed so that they can elect good people without regard to the influence of money or the influential people in the localities. The military has the ISOC, which monitors and investigates things in coordination with administrative and police officials.

[KHAO PHISET] What will happen in the future if the use of money becomes even worse?

[Suchinda] This is a good opportunity for the mass media to help. What can be done to ensure that we have a proper democratic system composed of good people? Are good people elected today? I don't think so. People don't look at their good qualities or abilities. Talented people are tired of this and don't want to run for office. If they do, they are criticized. When people run for

office, all sorts of "dirt" is dug up about them. It takes a lot of money. Without money, you can't win.

[KHAO PHISET] If this situation becomes worse, that is, if the use of money and political influence grows worse, will it become necessary to make changes or use resolute power for several years?

[Suchinda] You must help bring about good changes. I have told many MPs that they should discuss the country's problems on television. They should discuss elections and administration in general in a forthright manner. They don't have to talk about people trying to get this or that. That isn't their job. But no one has done this. I have suggested that they do such things in order to build a better democracy.

[KHAO PHISET] If these problems are not solved, what do you think will happen?

[Suchinda] We may end up with a democratic system like that in the Philippines, a Marcos-style democracy.

[KHAO PHISET] How likely is that?

[Suchinda] There is a great likelihood unless we all help each other. Actually, today's MPs are much better informed than those in the past. The percentage of educated MPs is quite high. These MPs must help solve these problems.

[KHAO PHISET] If it reaches the point where people take to the streets and demand that the military take action to help the nation, what will the military's duty be with respect to these problems?

[Suchinda] Soldiers are citizens, too. We have to listen to the people. But if the people made such a demand, I am not sure that that would be proper. We have to see what is right. But if that is what the majority want, that is what should happen. Otherwise, there would be rioting. The military is responsible for maintaining order and security in the country. That is our duty. We couldn't allow the country to fall into a state of anarchy. [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] The RTA CINC has always said that he will support a lawful and proper government. In your view, what does the word "proper" mean?

[Suchinda] In my view, a "proper" government is one that has the support of the people.

[KHAO PHISET] The support of the people. Does that mean that it has to be an elected government?

[Suchinda] Not necessarily. Take the Philippines, for example. Was the Marcos government a democratic government? He won every election. But later on, he lost the support of the people. That can happen. I like what Khukrit wrote on 23 January. Did Hitler come from a democratic system? One of my principles is not to rely on individual people. I focus on what is done. People change. A person who is good today may be bad tomorrow.

[KHAO PHISET] Then you do not think that it's sufficient for a proper government to come from elections and political parties.

[Suchinda] It's not that it isn't sufficient. I like what Phutthathat said about 5-6 years ago. He said that what the majority of people say is wrong if the majority of people are bandits. If they are bandits, they will talk like bandits. Right? If there are 90 bandits and 10 honest people, in an election, the bandits will always win. [passage omitted]

[Boxed items] As for the conflict between CRMA [Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy] Class 5 and Class 7, the "Young Turks," Gen. Suchinda said that there aren't any problems. Class 5 controls Class 7. "Manun (Maj Gen. Manun Rupkachon) was in the same unit with me," said Gen. Suchinda before turning to the 1-3 April 1981 coup attempt, which was spearheaded by Class 7. He said that "it was our duty to suppress the coup. We were doing our duty. But after that ended, there were no problems between us. We did our duty. We did not do that because it was Class 7. We would have had to do that regardless of which class was involved. We followed orders. [passage omitted]

[KHAO PHISET] There have been rumors that members of CRMA classes 9, 10, and 11 are taking action to have Gen. Sunthon Khongsomphong, the chief of staff officers, appointed RTA CINC. There have also been reports that Lt Gen. Mongkhon Amphonphisit, a member of CRMA Class 9, later informed you that no such action had been taken. What is the truth about this?

[Suchinda] I am not really interested in that. I haven't even read the newspapers. But Lt Gen. Mongkhon did come to see me. He said that he had not been involved in anything. I told him not to worry and said that I had never thought that he was involved in anything. A superior officer must always be kind to his subordinates. One duty of a superior officer is to show kindness to his subordinates.

[KHAO PHISET] Suppose that the situation changes and you do not become RTA CINC. How would you feel?

[Suchinda] I live my life according to religious principles. That is, I am content with what I have. I am a devout Buddhist. First, I believe that good brings good and that evil brings evil. Second, I am content with what I have. Third, whatever happens, the situation could always be worse. If one leg is broken, we can say that its good that both legs aren't broken. If both legs are broken, we can still see. As far as rank and position is concerned, I have never hoped to achieve a particular rank. I have a position and must carry out the duties of that position as best I can. It is not a matter of happiness or sorrow. I have never been sad or disappointed. Regardless of the situation, I can always joke and laugh. [end boxed item]

[Boxed item] Vietnam Could Still Be the Biggest Threat

Gen. Suchinda feels that even though the army has defeated the Communist Party of Thailand on the battlefield, even though the situation along the Thai-Cambodian border is more secure now that Vietnam has "withdrawn most of its forces" or now that the fighting is farther inside Cambodia, and even though the world situation has changed, there is still a chance of war breaking out. As an example, he cited the dispute between Thailand and Laos.

"Thus, we can't say that there won't be war. Even a small country such as Laos can create an incident such as the Ban Rom Kla incident," said the deputy RTA CINC.

Looking at the border situation, Gen. Suchinda said that there is cause for concern on all fronts, particularly the Vietnamese front. Vietnam is very strong militarily. "It has the forces to wage war." Even though he is not sure if Vietnam's policy is to invade Thailand, "as soldiers, we feel that Vietnam poses the greatest threat."

"Vietnam poses the greatest threat, because it has the largest army," said the deputy RTA CINC.

As for the prime minister's policy of transforming the Indochina battlefield into a marketplace, the deputy RTA CINC declined to say whether this was moving too fast. But he did voice support for this policy by saying that "even though this may not yet be the time, it will be good if this succeeds. We can reach that point, and it will be good if that happens. Fighting each other is bad. Arguing with each other is bad. Soldiers don't want to fight. Soldiers would like to stay at home with their families."

[KHAO PHISET] Have the Thai and Vietnamese armies talked with each other in order to find a way to cooperate? We have been confronting each other for more than 10 years now.

[Suchinda] Actually, it is not up to our two armies to hold a dialogue. That is a matter for the government. That is a foreign affairs matter. That does not concern the army. If the two governments hold negotiations, the army must follow the government. [passage omitted] [end of boxed item]

Sources Assess April Military Reshuffle

90OG0133A Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 5-11 Feb 90
pp 23, 24

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] "In the April military reshuffle, the army and the air force will reshuffle a large number of field commanders. This will be a major reshuffle. The number of important positions affected will be even larger than in October," said a senior officer to LAK THAI.

LAK THAI has learned that the army regions and the Special Warfare Command [SWC] will have a new structure. Consideration is being given to increasing the

number of deputy army region commander and deputy SWC commander slots from three slots to four slots. This is because the work of the army regions and Special Warfare Command, which is the equivalent of an army region, has increased greatly. The plan is to have one of the deputy army region commanders coordinate things with the army or Army Operations Center in Bangkok in order to facilitate the work. If the number of deputy commander slots increases from three slots to four slots, there will be slots for five more major generals, and these will be slots in the combat stream.

"The 3d Cavalry Division and the Phattana Naval Division, which the navy plans to establish in order to carry on development work in the navy's area of responsibility in keeping with the Marine Corps' policy of reaching out to the people, will probably be established this year," said a news source. "The 3d Cavalry Division, which will be based in Khon Kaen Province, will be subordinate to the 2d Army Region. It will probably be established this April. The Phattana Naval Division will probably be established in October. Slots for an air division, or regional wing, will definitely be established this April."

LAK THAI has learned that the army also plans to form another brigade. This brigade will have the capabilities to transfer forces quickly and efficiently to reinforce each of the army regions whenever necessary. This matter is now under consideration. If it is agreed to form another brigade in addition to the brigades subordinate to the army regions, this brigade should be called an independent brigade, mobile brigade, or support brigade. The unit most likely to be upgraded to such a brigade is the 9th Infantry Division based in Kanchanaburi Province,

said our news source. But at present, this is still just an idea that is being considered by senior commanders.

Our news source said that a "command-level" unit will be established. This will be equivalent to the army's Special Warfare Command and the navy's Marine Corps. This new command will be called the Air Defense Command. Its commander will be equal in rank to an army region commander or the commander of the Special Warfare Command. That is, he will be the equivalent of a lieutenant general and will command forces equivalent to those of an army region. The purpose of this is to make the air combat forces more efficient. At present, there is only one AAA division. The Air Defense Command will be composed of AAA, radar, and guided missile units. In effect, air defense systems will be joined together in this command. The formation of this Air Defense Command has already been approved.

Concerning the April military reshuffle, our news source said that Gen. Wanchai Ruangtrakun, the under secretary of defense, has announced a clear policy to his subordinates in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. An effort will be made to reserve the slots now existing in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense so that officers in the Office of the Under Secretary will have a chance to be promoted and appointed to higher positions. In the past, the services have "sent" people to fill the general officer slots of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, because their slots have all been filled and they have not been able to promote people. Thus, they have had to ask for slots from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. Gen. Wanchai has announced that he will reserve these slots for officers subordinate to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense so that these people can advance. [passage omitted]

POLITICAL**Revolutionary Veterans Voice Party Loyalty**

*902E0164 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Feb 90
pp 3, 4*

[Article by Nguyen Kien Phuoc]

[Text] The most recent meeting between General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh and 50 revolutionary veterans in Ho Chi Minh City gave me a strong impression of loyal and steadfast revolutionary soldiers who have spent almost their entire lives in struggle and sacrifice in the service of the party and the people, and who now, faced with the rapidly changing international situation, continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with the country and the party with thoughts and aspirations for a stable and pure party able to steer the Vietnamese revolutionary ship over challenges, waterfalls, and rapids to give our already independent people freedom and happiness.

A full day of meeting with the top party leader was not enough for the revolutionary veterans to explain all their feelings but a common voice emerged in the exchange of opinions, one of affection for the party, for Uncle Ho, and for the people. To mention the party is also to mention Uncle because he is the incarnation, intelligence, conscience, and honor of our party and people.

The veterans all mentioned Uncle's great lesson of flesh and blood closeness with the masses. To lose the confidence of the masses is to lose everything. From the things seen and heard in actual practice and the locations of party chapter activity, subwards, villages, and neighborhood teams, they warned of a serious situation. There is a phenomenon of an "official party," not a party of classes. The party now rarely goes among or down to the people. "Leaders rarely return to the primary level to meet with the workers and farmers." One comrade, all the way from Cao Bang, reflected, "Is the party 'deserted' now, and is it still concerned about the people or only for itself?" Neighborhood team meetings at the present time only involve charitable collections. Everything concerns the people contributing to the suffering and the poor. The people are the root and the force deciding the success or failure of the revolution. This is an accurate statement but who is concerned about mass organization work, especially at the primary level, because the number of people engaged in this work is still small. Resolution of the people's grievances and even those of cadres and state employees is slow and may be called negligent.

A general cry from the elders was that too much negativism exists. Lying is widespread and many party chapters, cadres, and party members are "afflicted." Factionalism, confrontation, and loss of solidarity are serious. Most fearful is the motive force of status envy. They are concerned about bureaucratism which Lenin warned was "communist arrogance" with special privileges and interests and actually individualism remote from the

bearing of a communist. Recalling Uncle Ho's last testament with the total benevolence and magnanimity of Uncle for the people and the nation, they proposed to the party and state that the year 1990 be "Ho Chi Minh Year, a year of a strong, stable, and pure party, and a year of pulling the masses back to the party, without setting a high tourism objective."

Recalling Uncle's last testament, the veterans emphasized an urgent mission: in reorganization of the party during the past 15 years, we have gnawed on our prestige too much. Many party members have titles but not a communist nature. They proposed an "inventory" of all shortcomings and mistakes for resolute correction. Our achievements are many but with building on one side and destruction on another.

In recalling Uncle Ho, they were awakened to the truth of Uncle's boundless love for all comrades and compatriots, and they emphasized: only with the restoration of true revolutionary comradeship can the coming political mission be properly achieved. It is solidarity within the party. It is the tempering of party member quality. With a strong and stable party and a people faithfully and loyally following the party, there is no adversary that cannot be destroyed. The enemy can interpose and destroy us only when we are the weakest.

It was infinitely moving listening to the feelings and clear intellect of these elders: We have chosen the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, and have nearly out entire lives followed the Communist Party, the Party of Uncle Ho, and are determined to remain with the party until the end. No multiple-parties or pluralism at all. Naturally, a theoretical panic presently exists, especially in the theory of socialist construction, including superstructure architecture and the economic and political aspects of Marxist-Leninist philosophy so our party must place its mind and thoughts back on the right road. The key is that the party must be strong, united and unanimous in eliminating poisonous mushrooms that are springing up; the vanguard and example role of a party member in action, ethics and quality. The year 1990 must be one of realistically and effectively studying Uncle Ho. The general thinking of the elderly comrades was oriented toward the party, the nation and the people, and toward hopes for a strong, stable and pure party, a rich and powerful country, and a free and happy people.

How noble the feelings of these elderly comrades!

ICA delegation Visits, Discusses Cooperation

*BK2402153490 Hanoi VNA in English 1601 GMT
23 Feb 90*

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 23—A delegation of the International Cooperative Alliance (I.C.A.) led by Lars Marcus, Swedish M.P. [member of Parliament] and I.C.A. president, paid a visit to Vietnam Feb. 14-20.

The delegation included Mrs. Amhelen Marcus and general director of I.C.A. office for Asia and the Pacific.

While here, the delegation met the central council of the Vietnam marketing cooperative with which it discussed measures to expand economic cooperation and trade exchange between Vietnam and cooperative organisations in other countries. Also discussed were I.C.A. programmes of action to assist the Vietnam marketing cooperative in material supplies and personnel training.

The I.C.A. delegation was received by Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vo Van Kiet. It also met with Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, president of the Vietnam Union of Peace, Solidarity and Friendship Organisations; Hoang Minh Thang, minister of home trade and representatives of F.A.O. [Food and Agriculture Organization], UNESCO, UNDP [United Nations Development Program] and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) in Hanoi to discuss measures for coordination of actions to help Vietnam's marketing cooperatives.

National Assembly Faces Problems on Entering Nineties

902E0170A Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese
9-15 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Thai Duy]

[Text] In the sixth session of the National Assembly, all deputies fully agreed to the proposal that the National Assembly and every deputy after each session would go over what has been or has not been done in order to raise the quality of the activities of the people's highest organ of power.

A number of problems that have existed for a long time without being resolved and limited and have been causing very serious damages to the people and the state require the National Assembly to learn from experience and to find the reasons why the highest organ of power has been helpless and has failed to effectively carry out its legislative and supervisory functions.

Let us take an example: the problems of the ethnic minorities in the highlands. For the last few years, in every session, deputies from the highlands had loudly presented their problems because all aspects of the region's conditions had been deteriorating and the region had been virtually forgotten. Shortly after the Sixth Party Congress, an inspection delegation led by Le Phuoc Tho, secretary of the CPV Central Committee, went to Son La and Lai Chau Provinces to find out about the state of agricultural production and forestry and other aspects of the daily life there. Everywhere the delegation went, it heard people of ethnic minorities describe the real conditions as approaching alarming scale: Diseases, particularly malaria and goiter, were spreading; the illiterate people became a majority, with many people who had been saved from illiteracy becoming illiterate again; there were no roads, or the existing roads now gradually became unusable; some localities encountered food shortages, and the material and cultural life of the ethnic minorities was very poor;

the ministries and sectors at the central level were no longer concerned about the highlands, and many policies which had become outdated and had been impeding the business of highland people continued to be in force.

The Secretariat inspection delegation also went to a few other highland provinces to do its work and later submitted urgent reports to the Secretariat and the Political Bureau. The Secretariat agreed that the conditions in the highlands had deteriorated and had become serious, foresaw the need to convene a central conference to discuss the highland problems, and issued directives to all sectors and echelons to the effect that they immediately overcome mistakes resulting from their failure to visit the highlands to see realities right there and take practical action to resolve in time the highlands' difficulties.

The directives of the Secretariat and Council of Ministers have been unable to touch the life of members of the highland ethnic minorities and the remote areas where it would be hard for motorized vehicles to reach.

In the fourth session of the National Assembly held at the end of 1988, Giang A Du, a member of the Hmong minority in Luong Luong Village of Moc Chau District and a cadre of the Son La Provincial Mass Agitation Committee, addressed the meeting. She said that during the war of resistance against America she had been urging members of ethnic minorities in the province to patiently bear hardships until the day of victory, that after the South had been liberated and the country had been reunified she had urged them to bear hardships for a few more years in order to rebuild the country, and that now after 13 years the ethnic minority people in Son La were bearing even greater hardships. Things were even worse in zone 2 (half way to the peak) and zone 3 (peak of the mountain). Should she keep telling lies?

She had the following to tell the National Assembly: Not a single village among the 100 villages of Son La Province had an information station, a newspaper, or a wired-radio station; movies-showing units virtually were no longer operative; superstition was more rampant. In many localities there was even a shortage of salt and many aspects of life were inferior to those during the resistance. Some highland deputies were concerned about the fact that the leadership of ministries and sectors had been claiming that they had been too busy to arrange time for a visit in the highlands, and that some of them had indeed visited the provincial headquarters but had not bothered to go to districts because of their hurried return.

In the recent sixth session of the National Assembly, I met her and asked her if she had addressed the meeting, but she quickly replied:

"I did not speak at all. The last time I had spoken, but for more than a year since then the life of members of ethnic minorities has remained as harsh as it was before. I spoke but everything remains the same."

Deputy Nong Viet Manh, vice chairman, State Nationalities Commission, spoke to the meeting and mentioned these words uttered by many representatives of highland ethnic teams:

"Our ears are full, our eyes are full, (but) our stomach is empty."

He proposed that a member of the Council of Ministers Standing Committee be responsible for the highlands because every ministry in the government is directly connected with the highlands.

How did it happen that the problems of the highlands, which have stood out as an eyesore for a long time and which, through many sessions of the eighth term of the National Assembly, every deputy found worrisome while saying that the highlands should not be left in such a bad shape, have been left unresolved, with empty promises and nobody being directly responsible for? Such an urgent matter could not be limited within the highlands, for there should have been thorough discussions and debates aimed at finding the real reasons behind all the hardships that the majority of the highland population had been bearing. The Political Bureau has just issued a resolution on a number of major positions and policies to promote socioeconomic development of the highlands, and we hope that state organs would materialize and institutionalize them in time and seriously implement them so as to improve the standard of living of the highland ethnic minorities.

Waste has reached an unbearable level and has lasted much too long; tremendous waste taking place in state organs has become obvious to the people in defiance of public opinion and the national policy of practicing thrift recommended by the state and, therefore, makes people believe that official positions and policies exist only on paper. And yet the National Assembly does not seem to realize that the matter has become extremely urgent and would need timely measures in order to be stopped.

Party and state sectors and organs, including their trade organizations, and many localities have violated state principles and laws (evading tax, smuggling goods, selling and buying goods banned by the state, and so on); while collectives have not benefited very much from that, a number of individuals have made big profits because of business activities and services. This is also an urgent matter that is undermining our economy, creating so much corruption and waste, and considerably affecting the prestige of the party and state. This urgent matter has just been presented to the National Assembly, but it has not yet been discussed and debated so as to adopt positive guidelines aimed at resolving the problem of state organs themselves pursuing illegal business activities.

A large majority of the people is being deeply concerned and worrying about the above-mentioned matters which are related to national policies and the life of people, and yet the National Assembly has not yet expressed its

appropriate concern, nor has it used its power more resolutely to stop the many negative things that painfully originated from many state organs.

In his speech delivered at the meeting of the heads of National Assembly deputy delegations during the recent sixth session, Vo Chi Cong, member of the Political Bureau and chairman of the Council of State, stressed the slogan, "The people know, the people discuss, the people decide, the people do things, the people control." It points to another extremely important right of the people, "the people decide," for the people not only speak and do things but also, through their National Assembly deputies, have the right to decide about important matters having to do with national policies and people's life, thus exercising the supreme right of control over the observation of the Constitution and the law.

We believe that by continuing to renovate the ways it carries out its activities and to further heighten the responsibility of every deputy, about which Vo Chi Cong has offered many positive ideas, the National Assembly, as it enters the 1990's, will raise its effectiveness and act in a manner that deserves more and more the confidence of our people.

Party's Socialist Renovation Task Discussed

902E0165A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Feb 90
pp 3, 4

[Article by Professor Nguyen Duc Binh, member of the CPV Central Committee, director of Nguyen Ai Quoc Institut]

[Text] Extremely important results achieved during 3 years of renovation have been the valuable experience produced by actual practice, the creative experience of the masses and of party organizations, and the successes as well as reverses in experimenting with and seeking various forms and methods during the process of renovating aspects of social life. What can be said about the most general features of this experience?

Necessity for and Principles of Renovation

Virtually everyone is now talking about and recognizes the necessity for renovation. Even the very few who initially expressed doubt about the renovation task and worried it would cause a loss of socialism and revolutionary results now recognize the impossibility of not renovating.

This conclusion is clear-cut. Clear-cut not only because of the old, previously ineffective management mechanism and economic procedures that have increasingly illustrated their unacceptability. The conclusion is clear-cut also and especially because evolution of the mechanism and working procedures has shown clear effectiveness in actual daily life. This reason truly bears weight because, if there had been no results for everyone to perceive, doubt about the renovation task would have persisted despite the countless efforts made in criticizing

the old. It is clearly not pure theory but primarily actual life that has decisively rejected many of the previous concepts considered sacred until they collide with consideration as an ideological offense. Only a few years ago, even in mentioning commodity production, many people were still cautious. Such general issues as one or two markets, one or two prices, whether the state holds a monopoly on grain, etc., underwent many years of tangled and indecisive debate until ultimately, actual practice over the past several years produced a total resolution. If "mental renovation" initially received no small amount of ridicule and mockery, it has now been correctly accepted by society as essential to survival, because without renovation of thought and reasoning, fundamental renovation or a clear and firm course in actual life would be impossible.

The renovation our party advocates is renovation with principle. It can be no different. General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh said, "There is nothing more harmful or dangerous than vacillation and mistakes in issues pertaining to basic principle." Renovation is not renunciation of the socialist objective but is primarily aimed at effectively achieving that objective by routes, forms, methods, and steps compatible with the law. That is the reason the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee brought up principles guiding the renovation task, subsequently further emphasized by the Seventh Plenum. Regrettably, some thought the party had not "opened" but had "tightened up," meaning an end to renovation. Again, some warmly praised the "five principles" but their praise originated from a concept of conservatism and dogmatism: they used the art of "endorsement in order to deny", endorsing the "five principles" to deny renovation.

Renovation must be thoroughly understood as a principle because a viewpoint exists in renovation of desiring to reestablish the socialist objective and route chosen by our party and Uncle Ho. "Total reevaluation of historic events and personalities" is demanded. According to them, our national history apparently blundered when confronted with crossroads at the beginning of the 20's. They raise the issue that perhaps Uncle Ho introduced Marxism-Leninism too early, while the country still lacked the level of civilization necessary for advancement to socialism, and that this was the underlying root of the present slow situation.

Thus, an issue that collides with the viewpoint of principle is no longer simple. In fact, with careful examination, there is nothing simple in the subjective angle of those who raised the issue. With further examination at the objective level, the issue does not become complex; and there really are such objective levels. This level is a reality. Not an accidental or temporary reality but a universal reality occurring decade after decade—a reality that has become historic truth. Something that has become a historic truth becomes wasted effort if someone wants to "remake history." The history of previous decades is mentioned in reasoning whether "now is the same as then," or "if now differs from then."

The first question is, where is the historic viewpoint? the second, is history being remade? and the third, is there anything useful in such a turbulent history for stimulating advancement today?

This absolutely does not mean that anything in the past should be allowed to pass without analysis to gain the historic lessons essential for today, even if they are bitter lessons. However, could it be that the routes of Nguyen Ai Quoc and Uncle Ho were wrong while those of Phan Boi Chau or of Phan Chu Trinh or the Vietnamese Nationalist Party were right? Could it be that our party that made its debut in 1930 was a mistake of history? The August Revolution, the wars of resistance against France and America, the transition of the north to socialism after 1954, and the reunification of the north and south after 30 April 1975 with the entire country gradually rising to socialism; could all these things have been a string of historic mistakes? Clearly only a normal intellect or minimum amount of national pride could never accept the raising of such an issue.

During the renovation process, it is impossible not to take precautions against and to promptly correct deviations from principle. It is impossible not to struggle against and reject viewpoints so distant that the basic issues and chosen socialist objective and route are brought up again, or to reject views totally denying values that have become historic truth, values created by the bones, blood, tears and sweat of countless generations of Vietnamese for the undertaking today; without which there would be nothing today to renovate or to speak of renovating.

However, note also that a viewpoint of conservatism, dogmatism and leftist immaturity cannot be used to resist rightist deviations. Dialectics teach that extremist views cannot overcome each other; conversely and objectively, one extreme usually becomes a means for strengthening the view of the other until ultimately, neither side reaches the truth with occasionally the two erroneous extremes meeting each other. Do not confuse principle and a determined stand with conservatism, dogmatism and inflexible thinking. Also do not confuse creativity, dynamism and a renovation spirit with isolation from and rejection of principles.

Renovation does not mean rejection of the chosen socialist objective and route. However, it is only possible to maintain that objective and route, and to win victory for that objective and route by the renovation method, not by any other way; resolute, decisive and strong renovation following the correct course of the Sixth Party Congress without wavering or hesitating.

Total and Uniform Renovation, With Appropriate Steps

First of all, the relationship between economic renovation and political renovation must be correctly resolved. During the initial period of renovation, our party advocated concentrating efforts on economic renovation, liberating production forces and developing every potential in society to create many commodity products to

meet the critical needs of the people. The requirement for renovation in our country originated first of all from economic life. It has produced effective benefits for the people—whose most pressing demand was gradual improvement of their daily material lives before placing their confidence in the renovation task. Also, only from this was it possible to convert the party's new renovation policy into a vital undertaking of the people, and to mobilize the strength of the people in carrying out the renovation task.

Actual practice has also shown that effective economic renovation will create a favorable environment for political reform. A new economic mechanism not only stimulates political renovation but also accurately points out the requirements and courses needed for political renovation. It shows, for example, the need for defining the functions between the party, government, and economic organizations; the need for improving state organization and management; the need for promulgating regulations, etc. An economic mechanism beginning business accounting causes a reduction in staff and a rearrangement of sections, ministries, and sectors; and resistance to bureaucratism becomes not only a critical need but one that can and must be achieved—something that previously in the old mechanism, despite countless party resolutions, could not be achieved because the condition itself was a natural product of the old mechanism.

This does not mean that economic renovation must be completed before political renovation is undertaken. First of all, there is no way that the matter could occur in such a distinctive manner. Economic renovation is impossible without simultaneous political renovation. The problem here is at what degree and what steps to choose in political reform to both ensure the need for creating a political premise for economic reform within each step without creating political chaos that obstructs economic reform. In the practice of political renovation in our country, efforts must be made to immediately do anything that can be done such as renovating the leadership methods and behavior of the party along a course of overcoming bureaucratism, dogmatism, dictatorship, and violation of the collective ownership rights of the people; achieving democracy within the party, in the preparation and issue of resolutions, and in cadre work; gradually renovating the election system, modes of daily activity, and the activities of population agencies; renovating and democratizing the press, culture, and literature; resisting negative occurrences such as oppression of the masses, corruption, etc.

There are also many tasks to be accomplished in the field of renovating the political system. The situation of inaction and resistance here is still serious. Basic reforms in this field have not been achieved; even many tasks that should and must be done immediately have not been. Nevertheless, the thing I want to emphasize in the relationship between economic and political renovation is that in our party, during the initial period, economic renovation has been taken as the primary element. Besides the reason that this is a most urgent demand of

life and the results attained, although only initial, of economic reform, must regain the confidence of the people in the party and the renovation task, there is also another important reason: that political renovation requires a period of necessary preparation, and cannot have an attitude of simplicity and neglect. Politics involve the nature and field of relationships between the classes. It should not be forgotten that we are living in a society and world in which class and class struggle still exist. Hurried political reform without preparation of the necessary level and form could easily create a loss of political stability; and when political instability occurs, especially before any results are attained in economic renovation, the entire renovation task can encounter many obstacles and difficulties.

Of course, all of the statements above cannot be considered a reason for rejecting political renovation, or for neglecting or stifling political renovation. Such is not possible because first, the vital interests of the people involve not only economic life but also political control; second, a great many problems exist in the political field that must be resolved and renovated; and third, if these problems are not basically resolved, they will at some time or another become the greatest hindrance to renovation and economic development and to the entire renovation task in general. Rejection and deliberate delay of political reform, as experience has shown, cannot avoid payment of a heavy price, even under circumstances in which the material lives of the people do not become miserable.

Something that must be added here is that whether there is political reform or economic reform, the entire renovation task in general must absolutely be carried out gradually, avoiding impatience and haste. Nothing can more easily create disappointment and more quickly destroy confidence than hasty measures with countless fine promises that immediately fail in achievement. There should be no allusions and allusion should absolutely not be created for the people. Renovation is a long-term undertaking filled with difficulty and complexity that demands many years and possibly many decades. Of course, some positions and measures have been accurate and correct, and have produced extremely rapid results. However, no position or measure is capable of producing instant results. It is a process of simultaneous development, searching and creation; the evolution of renovation is extremely complex and can never plan on every situation that could occur. Not everything can be anticipated, especially success, and some things must be done before knowing whether they are truly accurate, right or wrong. Many tasks must be accomplished but lack sufficient conditions to be done immediately. Occasionally, objective conditions exist but subjective conditions are not ripe, or vice versa. Many things, although theoretically correct are not thought to be uniformly achievable once announced. Resistance and impedance, originating sometimes from within social psychology itself and each individual himself, are both the objective and the theme of renovation,

including those most impatient with renovation. Normal psychology is to demand that renovation produce immediate results within a couple days. Opportunists and demagogues often take advantage of or agitate this state of mind among the masses because of motives and objectives remote from the interests of the masses themselves. Therefore, along with resisting conservatism and delay, it is necessary to resolutely resist impatience, arbitrary illusions and demagoguery.

Excerpt of Resistance Club Leaflet

902E0169A Paris QUE ME in Vietnamese Feb 90
pp 13, 36

[Text] Editor's note: In the Canh Ngo [lunar year of the horse] Spring issue of QUE ME, that is No. 105-106, we announced the latest activity of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Former Resistance Fighters Club: distribution of leaflets denouncing the repressions of democracy and human rights of the Hanoi leaders. We based this announcement only on the verbal descriptions of a number of recent Vietnamese arrivals in France. Recently, we found the entire text of this leaflet and learned it was actually a letter the Former Resistance Fighters Club had sent to the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee. Possibly to mobilize mass support, the Former Resistance Fighters Club used this method on one hand to send a letter to the Communist Party Central Committee and on the other, to print many copies for covert distribution in the streets of Saigon in the form of leaflets.

The text of the letter consisted of four points. The first two (1 and 2) contained nothing of importance, only displaying an attitude of support for the renovation policy recently issued by the Sixth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party at the end of 1986 (Point 1), and protesting the decision compelling the Ho Chi Minh City Grain Corporation to deliver the Saigon-Petro facility and rice mill to central management (Point 2). In these two points, the Former Resistance Fighters Club presented one experience, "During the past 15 years since 30 April 1975, the central government has ordered the transfer of factories, with dismantling machinery and equipment, from Ho Chi Minh City to central (Hanoi) management. Regrettably, all of these things disappeared without a trace. These were painful lessons for those with a spirit of responsibility for society and the nation."

Because the last two points were of greater importance, we wish to print them verbatim so readers can understand the despotic and dogmatic attitude of the Hanoi leaders and at the same time understand one of the struggle movements calling for freedom and democracy in Vietnam:

"3. Our country demands total renovation and total revolution, not the renovation of only one aspect or one field. The resolution of the Sixth Congress and resolutions of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee pointed out this total renovation. However,

actual practice has indicated only guidance from the central government seriously crippling economic renovation and neglecting political renovation. Although the party resolution stated: 'Expand socialist democracy,' and achieve 'democratization openness, dialogue, and debate,' actual practice has been entirely the reverse. The central government has failed to achieve democratization in the press and occurrences of pressure and restriction have created a strong atmosphere in social opinion.

"This shows that central leadership lacks strict compliance with the party resolution on total renovation and simultaneously lacks strict compliance with the Constitution on the democratic rights of the citizen. Our party led in the presentation of a Constitution endorsed by the people and voted on and passed by the National Assembly. Consequently, the party cannot stand on the Constitution and the Law but must be a shining example in respecting the Constitution and the Law. The words and actions of the party do not follow one another, easily creating doubt among cadres, party members and the masses about party leadership.

"Party members and cadres, especially veteran cadres, have sent a great many proposals to the central government but have never received a reply or a solution in return.

"During the past several decades, retired and veteran cadres have suggested that the central government establish a Veteran's Association and an Association of Former Resistance Fighters but all these suggestions have been denied. Not only were they disapproved but not one document was received. All these things show that the central government despises retired veteran cadres and party members and has no need to consider their legitimate aspirations because they are regarded as wanting to 'seize power' from the party and 'desiring subversion.' The central government does not want dialogue with cadres and party members in general and veteran cadres in particular in order to maintain its right of cadre judgement. However, the historic reality of 40, 50, and 60 years of revolutionary work—an entire lifetime offered to the party and the nation—of veteran cadres affirms their human and steadfast qualities despite what anyone hints otherwise. A party unwilling to listen and accept the critical suggestions of cadres, party members and the masses is a party weakening itself because the struggle for self-criticism is an existing and unceasingly advancing law of the party clearly recorded by statute.

"Without dialogue, debate, or listening to the opinions of cadres, party members and the masses, the party and state, in leadership and management, are leaning toward directive, administrative, authoritative, forceful, and armed (arms and ammunition, electric prods, and German shepherds) measures to deal with the masses. Incidents occurring in Cong Hoa Hamlet (Thanh Hoa Province), Tu Trinh Hamlet (Thai Binh Province) and in Lang Chuoi Nuoc—Cho Ngap field and Dam Doi of Minh Hai Province, and the Ho Ky Hoa incident (in Ho

Chi Minh City) have clearly shown the tendency of the party and state to use 'iron fisted' measures to establish social order. It was not strangers but the farmers themselves, once the main force of the revolution, and the students, once the revolutionary struggle force in the urban area, who directly tasted the arms, ammunition, and German shepherd savagery of our proletarian dictatorship and socialism. This is truly sorrowful.

"If this situation continues, it will signal misfortune for our people. We think our party should give it great consideration. The party and state should not use administrative measures or the armed forces to achieve its designs but should better change to the use of mass motivation measures and development of the party's revolutionary mass organizations for achievement.

"4. After submitting many proposals, we once again suggest that the central government endorse establishment of our Veterans Association in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

"Respectfully saluting renovation."

Some of the veteran cadres signing the letter: 1. Ho Van Chau 2. Ha Huy Giap 3. Nguyen Ho 4. To Ky (Major General) 5. Pham Khai 6. Dao Son Tay 7. Nguyen Thi Hong Tam 8. Vo Van Thanh 9. Huynh Van Tieng 10. Tran Van Tra (General), etc.

MILITARY

Article Points to Good Features in 1989 Military Training

902E0154B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 1 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Pham Minh Chau]

[Text] At the start of the 1989 training year, the National Defense Ministry had a policy calling for it to make training an orderly undertaking and to raise further the quality of training of troops. In order to implement that policy it provided units in the army as a whole strict guidance in terms of the substance of training and actual steps.

First of all, we must mention the important progress made by the two units which were reviewed by order of the ministry. In the exercises they recently organized, they obtained good overall results, which were also highly evaluated by representatives from the army as a whole who had come to take part in the training course. The important fact that was learned from the two reviewed units was as follows: Although the living conditions of troops and the material base guaranteeing good training still encountered many difficulties, they could always be overcome if our cadres and troops displayed a sense of responsibility and good determination. The second lesson that was learned from them was as follows: In order to improve the quality of training, we must not only renovate the contents of training and the way of organizing it but also pay attention to totally

building units by taking care of the living conditions of cadres and soldiers, maintaining discipline, and building the foundation for the regular army and the material base needed to guarantee good training. In building and training, the two reviewed units recognized as the results of their efforts an initial change in the 1989 training year, which would serve as a basis for our army as a whole to apply it and to further develop it in all units in the 1990 training year.

The second outstanding feature in the 1989 training year was the fact that our army as a whole underwent an important change in determining the contents of training by making them close to reality and suitable for our army's traditional fighting method, as well as capable of responding to the needs at different levels in the war for defense of the fatherland. Specifically in 1989 all units paid attention to technical training and tactics for individuals and small detachments based on our traditional fighting method and suitable for the currently available equipment and our ability to equip ourselves in the future. However, the contents of training did not remain the same but there was a development taking into consideration our actual combat objectives and ability to deal with the adversaries' new technical equipment and weapons. Particularly the training of main-force troops was closely linked with various forms of combat in the defense zones and was aimed at creating a close coordination of forces in various terrains. Because of such realistic training contents we were somehow able to limit formalism in training. In 1989, almost all exercises and drills had very realistic contents, with the latter reflecting quite correctly the quality of training in different units.

The third outstanding feature was the advanced training given to our cadres. Because it was the factor that would determine the quality of training, this year the ministry maintained a very strict leadership over this work. In the middle of training stage one, when an examination was carried out to judge organizing capabilities, it was found that weaknesses remained in the training method of detachment cadres in the two reviewed units. The ministry then gave orders for the units to stop the work in order to provide cadres with advanced training. To end the training stage one, the ministry organized two training courses for cadres in the army as a whole, and after that let individual units provide their own cadres with training in the subjects where there had been weaknesses. Although we should continue to do more in terms of providing advanced training to raise the capabilities of cadres, mostly squad, platoon, and detachment cadres, the achievements last year have created a new change, namely, to make units pay more attention to this aspect of their work.

The three features that highlighted the 1989 training year are the very basic matters that will ensure the quality of our army's training and combat capabilities. However, what was obtained in the 1989 training year is just a start, and not a steady start yet, and compared to the need to improve the quality of our army in all its aspects, it is a limited one. In order to make 1990 capable of

building on the results obtained in 1989 and moving the training task toward more total and steadier quality, all units must act to resolve any remaining problems that have hampered their training. This involves caring for the material and spiritual life of our troops and ensuring the material base for training, such as building training grounds and ensuring the supply of training materials, gasoline, and oil. In connection with supplying gasoline and oil, we must raise the question of effective management and consumption, and of fighting corruption and waste; the goal is to build training as an orderly undertaking. Only by maintaining it as an orderly undertaking can we ensure training our troops in acquiring great combat capabilities and other abilities, while having a strong sense of organizing discipline, which will create strength for individuals and combined strength for units.

In the 1990 training year, a very new matter needs to be raised, namely, our army as a whole begins to enter the stage of building and training our troops under warless conditions and consequently requires appropriate and regular ideological leadership so as to heighten vigilance, to do its best to carry out the training task, and to score greater and greater achievements.

Haiphong Struggling With Problem of New Soldiers Going AWOL

902E0166C Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 31 Jan 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Mai Nam Thanh]

[Text] In 1989, the municipality of Hai Phong was one of the outstanding units of Military Region Three with regard to recruiting and delivering troops during the first cycle and fulfilled its annual quota before 15 March. But before it could celebrate, worries arose. Only a few weeks after enlisting, now and then a soldier would abandon his unit and return to the locality. That phenomenon steadily increased and by the beginning of September 1989 the number of deserters amounted to 10 percent of the enlistees. That was the highest ratio ever in the municipality of Hai Phong. Recently the Municipal Draft Council, along with delegates of the organs and mass associations, and representatives of the military command committees of 12 wards and districts, went to the Chi Lang Regiment, the leading unit in Hai Phong in 1989 with regard to receiving troops, in order to discover the reasons for, and discuss measures to coordinate in overcoming, the above situation during the 1990 draft cycles.

Most of the soldiers who deserted and returned to the localities have defended their mistaken acts by claiming that "life in the unit was miserable and I couldn't take it." What is the truth? It is true that the life of a soldier is difficult and arduous, especially the life of new soldiers in the border areas, but according to on-the-spot observations in the Chi Lang Regiment, a number of units have not yet taken effective steps to overcome the difficulties and improve the living conditions of new recruits. In Unit 1, Battalion 4, more than 600 cadres and enlisted men ate together in a very crowded mess hall and lacked many implements, such

as pans, pots, bowls, and chopsticks. As for food, they told us that all month long they ate only dried, salted fish. In some units the dried, salted fish ran out and the resolution of the unit's party committee expressed determination to "restrict the long-term consumption of granular salt." That messing situation was a shock for the new soldiers and did not correspond to the intensity of their labor and training.

The young soldiers of Battalion B37 said that they often had to gather firewood, even on Sundays, and now and then the battalion party chapter organized "volunteer labor," also primarily to gather firewood. They gather firewood for the battalion, regimental, and division mess halls, and to sell to build up the unit fund. Another factor has also exerted considerable influence in causing the units' discipline to be in some regards unequal and lack respect for the men. In Battalion 4, two detachment cadres slapped enlisted men during training. While the enlisted men ate in collective mess halls, some company and battalion cadres had separate kitchens to "improve their living conditions."

Also in the course of "on-the-spot observations" in the Chi Lang Regiment, the Hai Phong Draft Council clearly realized the responsibility of the localities in troops recruitment, and that cooperation among the units, the localities, and the families in managing and educating the soldiers is still incomplete. When recruiting troops, all attention should not be placed on the health, educational, and personal history standards; propagandizing and teaching consciousness and responsibility of defending the motherland to youths before they enlist must also receive attention. Many districts and wards in Hai Phong have not carried out that task thoroughly and effectively. Therefore, the recruitment pool in the districts and wards usually must be two or three times larger. In the city of Kien An, it must be six times larger. A considerable number of localities regard turning over the required number of troops on time as the only goal. Some cadres sign orders for youths to enlist and a short time later sign requests to allow them to be discharged "because of difficult family conditions." In that regard, many families have done things that have adversely influenced the thinking of their children, such as offering bribes and favors to obtain permission for their children to delay enlistment. When their children arrive at the unit they not only do not urge them to overcome difficulties and endure hardships, but write letters to complain and list grievances, and even encourage their children to desert their unit. In Kien Thuy, when two families visited their children they urged the two soldiers to desert and return home together.

The military draft law has been implemented for several years, but at some levels and in some sectors it has not been implemented fully and it is still violated. In the Chi Lang Regiment, many soldiers deserted because of dissatisfaction over some of their friends, who were children of cadres with rank and authority in the localities, being exempted from fulfilling their military obligations or getting draft deferments. Some rich families spend money so that their children can study in the expanded

(irregular) curricula of the specialized schools to avoid their military obligations because that category receives priority in draft deferments. To date no military personnel have been prosecuted for the crime of desertion, but have only been fined or sentenced to reform labor. With regard to ensuring the material living conditions and morale of troops, in general there are still many difficulties. Funds are limited and units often owe the bank, which directly affects the soldiers' lives. The reason why the soldiers in Unit 1, Battalion 4 had to eat granular salt over long periods of time was that over a 3-month period, although the battalion mess had a surplus of 4 million dong in food funds in a bank account, it could not withdraw cash. Salary and allowance payments were late, so they had to find ways to purchase food "beyond the fence" and sold military equipment. All of those things became reasons why the soldiers violated discipline.

The above are three of the main factors isolated during the work of the Hai Phong Municipal Draft Council at the Chi Lang Regiment in seeking to understand the situation of new soldiers deserting and going AWOL. We have learned that afterward the Chi Lang Regiment organized a number of meetings on that topic and cooperated with the municipality of Hai Phong in receiving 188 troops who returned to the unit. On the basis of the working methods and results of the Hai Phong Draft Council, the localities and units must study their specific situation in order to take steps to manage and educate the troops and build strong units. In the immediate future, they must coordinate in doing a good job of carrying out the troop recruitment cycle at the beginning of March of this year.

Military Unit on Offshore Island Maintains Combat Readiness

902E0154A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 28 Dec 89 p 1

[By Nguyen Duc Son]

[Text] Thuyen Chai Island (Spratly Islands) has properly been asserting its task of remaining ready for combat. The unit there has always displayed vigilance and has maintained and seriously carried out the on-duty procedures, such as those in connection with command, professional duties, combat alert, and round-the-clock guard duties.

As the result of that, the unit succeeded in discovering targets in the air and at sea—more than 100 aircraft/times and 200 boats/times—and reporting such sightings in time for commanders at all levels to take action against them. In order to raise the level of its troops' combat capabilities, the island regularly kept them on the alert and trained them in carrying out on-the-spot combat plans and coordinated assistance nearly 100 times among the islands, as well as maintained uninterrupted signal and liaison services, with scores reaching 98 percent.

In addition to the above-mentioned work, the island properly carried out training and learning plans to satisfy as much as possible the needs of its task in different stages. It paid attention to training its cadres and soldiers in the method of "assimilating" all sectors so as to allow them to skillfully use all available weapons. In the recent shooting with real ammunitions, 100 percent of the troops on the island got acceptable scores, with 80-85 percent performing at the good and outstanding levels.

Furthermore, cadres on the island also had positive plans for maintenance of weapons and technical equipment; every week and every day, cadres, on-duty officers, and emulation teams would check the work of soldiers to see if they had properly cleaned and stored weapons, and would correct right away any shortcomings while praising those cadres and soldiers who had shown a high degree of responsibility. Consequently, weapons and equipment have always been kept in good shape in terms of technical requirements and have been satisfying the unit's combat needs.

Military Region 7 Fulfills 1989 Tasks, Weaknesses Remain

902E0154C Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 10 Jan 90 p 1

[By Tran Nguyen Trang]

[Text] Last year, although Military Region 7 had to carry out many tasks at the same time, it fulfilled relatively well the assigned tasks thanks to great efforts and a close coordination with other localities and properly organized the withdrawal from Cambodia of the Vietnamese volunteer troops who belonged to the military region. Localities in the region properly organized reception and arranged for jobs for tens of thousands of volunteer troops who now returned after having fulfilled their task. In addition, the military region basically fulfilled the 1989 plans for building the all-people national defense. Almost all localities were able to establish CPV military committees or party affairs committees operating in accordance with the new mechanism. In a coordination with the people's public security forces and the people, the armed forces in the military region succeeded in maintaining political security and social order and security.

Implementing the National Defense Ministry directives, the military region reorganized its forces by paying greater attention to raising the quality of its militia and self-defense forces. Currently 685 out of 825 subwards and villages have consolidated their militia and self-defense squads and platoons. Particularly since October 1989, the military region has been cooperating with Tay Ninh, Song Be, and Long An Provinces in conducting control work aimed at consolidating the militia and self-defense forces in villages along the border.

In 1989, compared to the needs of its tasks, Military Region 7 still had weaknesses. The degree of combat readiness of many main-force and local units was not high. There were many shortcomings in the management of troops. A number of units failed to fulfill their 1989

training plan. A rather common phenomenon showed a continued decrease of the will to fight and a lack of peace of mind in connection with army building.

In 1990, the military region pays more attention to training in heightening the will to fight and the ability to fulfill all assigned tasks. Particularly, the localities along the border and in important areas are organizing efforts to build good forces in order to remain ready for combat and to steadily defend the fatherland's land, airspace, and waters.

Ho Chi Minh City Struggling To Find Jobs for Demobilized Soldiers

*902E0166A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 23 Jan 90 p 1*

[By Hai Hoang]

[Text] According to initial statistics, a total of 20,000 troops who have fulfilled their obligations and have been demobilized or discharged will return to live in Ho Chi Minh City in 1990. Because the city already has a backlog of tens of thousands of unemployed, that will be a very great difficulty for the Party committee echelons, governmental administrations, and mass associations.

Analyzing the situation of discharged and demobilized troops, comrade Tran Anh Tuan, director of the Labor Service and Supply Center (of the Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare Service of Ho Chi Minh City), said that the greatest difficulty in creating jobs for the returning troops is that their educational levels are too low. Nearly 100 percent of the returnees do not have specialized trades, while 90 percent of them want jobs immediately (50 percent because their family circumstances are extremely difficult and 15 percent because they have no means of support). Only about five percent aspire to study trades and five percent want to work abroad. Going into the matter more deeply, of the troops who have fulfilled their obligations and returned to Ho Chi Minh City, 40 percent have less than a Level-2 educational level. That characteristic, along with the aspirations of the returning discharged and demobilized troops, has become a difficult task for the city.

Furthermore, it is necessary to mention another difficulty for the discharged and demobilized troops who return and seek employment: every year, in all of Ho Chi Minh City there are only about 30,000 new jobs, and all require good vocational skills and a minimum craftsman level of 3/7.

In Ho Chi Minh City at present, in the system of vocational training installations of the Labor Service and Supply Center alone there are 18 vocational training installations in the precincts and districts. Furthermore, there are thousands of private vocational schools. In order to enable troops who return after fulfilling their military obligations to have trades and jobs, the city authorized the Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare Service to arrange for precincts and districts to hold

vocational training classes and charge full tuition, reduced tuition, or no tuition to discharged and demobilized troops. In 1989 the Labor Service and Supply Service alone referred or directly trained more than 2,000 troops. Especially, in order to have money to organize vocational training for demobilized and discharged troops who return to the precincts and districts in Ho Chi Minh City, about 20-22 million dong were earmarked from the local budget. Precinct 10 alone spent 40 million dong to provide vocational training for troops returning to the locality.

In providing jobs for discharged and demobilized troops in Ho Chi Minh City, there is another difficulty that must be taken into consideration. At present, the lowest income level of cadres, workers, and civil servants in the city is about 80,000-100,000 dong per month. Therefore, any job provided the troops must meet that income level. There are also many instances of construction units far from the city going to the Labor Service and Supply Center to hire hundreds of workers, but because they would have to work hundreds of kilometers from the city and the income level was only 60,000 dong a month, the Center dared not refer the discharged and demobilized troops to the jobs.

Providing jobs for the discharged and demobilized troops in Ho Chi Minh City is difficult and complicated, and requires investment and assistance by all echelons and sectors. In order to perform that task well, in 1990 the Municipal Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare Service has an explicit work program: teaching supplementary educational courses and trades to nearly 3,000 people and finding jobs for 5,000 people (extremely difficult tasks), arranging for about 1,000 people to do cooperative work abroad, enrolling about 1,000 students in the middle schools, colleges, and vocational schools, and arranging for 10,000 people to study trades in accordance with the priority policy and providing jobs for them. It is estimated that the sector must have more than 2 billion dong to meet the expenses of that work. In order to have an independent and regular source of funding, a task that must be carried out immediately in Ho Chi Minh City is to officially set up a fund to support vocational training for discharged and demobilized troops and the children of families covered by the policy. Its principal sources of income will be part of the municipal budget, 10 percent of the annual public welfare labor fund, support by the organs, enterprises, and individuals in Vietnam and abroad, etc. Only thereby will it be possible to ensure long-term results in the task of providing jobs for discharged and demobilized troops in Ho Chi Minh City. To do a good job of providing employment for discharged and demobilized troops is to utilize a rather large labor force that has been trained and forged in military ranks, which will have a positive effect among the people, especially youths, with regard to the defense of the motherland.

Air Defense Service Reviews Training Achievements

902E0166B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 30 Jan 90 p 1

[By Nguyen Huu Diep]

[Text] Thanks to rational decentralization in drafting plans (the lower echelon drafts its own plan, which is directly approved by the upper echelon, and the detachment level carries out the drafting and implementation of weekly training schedules), last year the units of the air defense armed forces branch overcame the situation of training programs and contents being imposed from above, created a high degree of initiative, and at the same time developed collective and individual creativity in training. Many effective training methods of the past were restored and applied skillfully, such as concentrated combat crew training managed by the regimental echelon (in the case of missiles); practicing and carrying out rapid firing, and fire command training on sand tables (in the case of anti-aircraft artillery); the implementation of two-way alerts (from the top down and from the bottom up), the training of combat crews of radar stations and installations, and the assembly and disassembly of radar antennae (in the case of the radar combat arm). Unit H67 (of Group B65) took the initiative of using the training lessons of that detachment (the lessons had been standardized) for the cross-inspection of other detachments and to enable the detachments to train in accordance with additional lessons in order to improve the quality of combat crews.

Annual inspections and exercises involving the firing of live ammunition have shown that the quality of training and the combat-readiness level and capability at the detachment level in all three combat arms have been further improved and meets the needs of such complicated contingencies as fighting the enemy under complicated conditions, surprise attacks by low-flying aircraft, night fighting, etc.

Military Cadres To Refine Operational, Strategic Thinking

902E0158A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese Dec 89 pp 88-94

[Article by Professor-Senior Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao of the Advanced Military Academy]

[Text] High-ranking military cadres must have awareness of and basic views on organization and building of armed forces; preparations for, and organization and waging of war; and conduct of strategic combat action and command of combat operations.

In order to have such views and awareness, they must fully grasp the party's political and military line and tasks, adhere to the Marxist-Leninist thoughts and views on war and army, have the revolutionary outlook on life of the proletarian class, and fully grasp the Marxist dialectic.

The party's political and military line and tasks are based on the revolutionary line and task, which have as foundation the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on proletarian revolution; on the characteristics and nature of war, as well as the strategic object of revolution and object of combat; on our capabilities and political, spiritual, economic, and material potentials; on the alliance with our allies; and on the national quintessence, traditions, and so on.

We must rely on the above-mentioned line, thoughts, views, and bases to find the laws of war and its movement; on the laws of war to determine strategic and operational laws; and on strategic and operational laws to study the art of waging war and conducting operations. In order to have an awareness of these laws and their movement, we must adopt correct methodology. To have correct methodology means to be able to apply principles in a flexible, creative, nondogmatic, nonconservative, and nonmetaphysical manner.

A very important aspect of grasping the laws is to find contradictions in the process of applying these laws. Because we are small and weak and fight a large and strong imperialist force, how do we fight it? What laws to follow? This requires all-people, total, and long-term fighting, and fighting evolving from small to large scale. Operational law requires that we fight outside trenches first, in difficult jungle and mountainous terrains where the enemy cannot display their strength, which is weapons, technical power, and mobility. These are the greatest contradictions and the greatest and toughest difficulties that must be resolved through methodology. Therefore we can summarize as follows:

- To carry on a protracted fight is the strategic law of the weak fighting the strong.
- To fight with mobility is the tactical and operational law of the weak fighting the strong.

Through the historical experiences of the nation and the world, with the characteristics and nature of war and the party's political and military line, we can briefly mention some common laws of the people's war for the good cause and war for liberation as follows:

1. People's war.
2. Total war, with the political and spiritual strength serving as the basis for developing other strengths and creating a combined strength.
3. Protracted warfare aimed at changing the balance of power and the force involved.
4. Guerrilla warfare combined with conventional warfare.
5. Organization of resistance armed forces with three branches of service and all-people armament.
6. Clinging to a common base and fighting the enemy on all battlefields, in all strategic zones, in many forms, and with small- to large-scale measures.

The above-mentioned common laws for the war for liberation can also be applied to the war for defense of the fatherland. About the latter, under new conditions, there can be a number of new laws, such as:

The law of destroying enemy vitality must go hand in hand with protecting territory.

Operations take place in the beginning without going through the developmental stages of battle, combat action, and then operation.

Defensive operations can take place right in the beginning of the war, instead of in the stages in the middle and end of the war as in the case of the liberation war.

And there are many other new matters.

About the principle of strategic and operational combat, there are in both wars for liberation and for defense of the fatherland many similarities and also some aspects having to do with development, such as attacking in a resolute and flexible manner, concentrating force on fighting to destroy, using wit and cleverness, taking initiative, keeping the secret and surprise aspect, ensuring smooth progress in all aspects, and so on.

In the war for defense of the fatherland today, the question of protecting and fighting in the rear area obviously arises and the question of fighting deep in the enemy's rear area will eventually come up.

About fighting methods, we still apply the ones that we normally are good at and the uniquely Vietnamese traditional ones, such as closely combining conventional and guerrilla warfares; intertwining our combat action with that of the enemy; striking at the entire enemy combat formation, dividing, dispersing, manipulating the enemy, and forcing him to fight in accordance with our tricks, battle formation, and fighting method; encircling, cutting off, and dividing the enemy combined with launching sudden offensive attacks on the flanks of enemy formation; seeking and selecting direction, area, target, and object in an accurate manner and in conformity to our capabilities and level of action; striking at vital points to cause total shake-up; using tactical maneuvers to deceive the enemy and to scatter him everywhere so as to concentrate strengths on striking at one point; and delivering a strong blow, creating an explosive situation, causing sudden changes leading to chain reaction, strategic defeat, and massive collapse (as in the 1950 Bien Gioi Border Operation in which we attacked Dong Khe and destroyed the enemy's hard-core mobile force without having to attack Lang Son, where the enemy fled; the Buon Ma Thuot Operation in the 1975 offensive action in the Central Highlands; and even the Spring 1975 strategic general offensive).

The strategic and operational thinking is the thinking on resorting to tricks and on battle formation.

President Ho Chi Minh said:

"Attack, advance, be on the defensive quickly as lightning. Have quick feet and good talent, then for sure

victory is yours. First have a broad vision and think very hard. Then resolutely and continually maintain the offensive posture. If you made a wrong move, you would sacrifice two "xe" (pieces in chess game) without regret; If the good opportunity came, even a single "tot" would bring you success. At the start, the two sides have the same force. But at the end, only one side scores victory. Launch attacks, be on the defensive while trying to make no mistakes. Then you deserve being called general and hero."¹ A small weight is worth a quintal. That is the posture of scoring victory over strong force.

Tran Hung Dao said: "Use a short military force for a long battle."

Nguyen Trai said: "For a weak force fighting a strong one, the former often strikes suddenly; For a small number opposing a large number, the former usually resorts to ambushes."

Our ancestors and President Ho Chi Minh had perfect strategic thinking.

Strategic and operational thinking must be combined with the use of methodology in order to evaluate the enemy and to get to know the law of action he adopts so as to devise the stratagems to deal with him.

In the war for defense of the fatherland, in the face of the Mongolian troops in the Yuan Dynasty who had been acting unrestrained in the world, Tran Hung Dao both fought back and retreated, and lured enemy troops deep into the country where he wore them out, tired them out, dispersed and divided them, and prevented them from using what they were good at and their strength. After having conducted small battles and after having got the right conditions, good battle formation, and ripe opportunity, he launched counterattacks to destroy them and finally to drive them from the country. Ho Quy Ly developed a mechanical and simple perception of both the enemy and our side and organized only passive defense; as a result, he was defeated by the Ming troops, a defeat that led to the loss of the country.

Today we have new points of development. We must use methodology to perceive the new points. Our country today is an independent and unified one. We must defend every inch of the fatherland's territory. We must destroy enemy forces to defend our territory. We must organize strong on-the-spot and mobile forces. We must build every village, organ, enterprise, neighborhood, district and precinct, province, and municipality into battlefield and fortress, large and small, and combine it with on-the-spot and mobile forces at all levels in order to fight the enemy in time and wherever he shows up. On-the-spot forces must be closely combined with mobile forces in order to destroy and wear out enemy forces, to protect localities, and to create favorable conditions for larger mobile forces to destroy them, to prevent their attacks, and to inflict losses on them. Our local armed forces must apply appropriate fighting methods so as to develop a high level of usefulness in destroying small enemy forces and restraining large

enemy forces (as to our main-force forces, they must fight concentrated battles aimed at large-scale destruction and at changing the situation).

In the use of forces, we must also use methodology to be aware of the following:

Sometimes to use large numbers to fight small numbers, sometimes the strength on both sides being the same, and sometimes to use a few to fight many. For instance, to fight an enemy battalion in strong bunker, we usually resort to a three-to-one advantage, i.e., we use a regiment to fight an enemy battalion.

But there is a situation that is opposite. Sometimes we fight an enemy reinforced battalion outside of a fortification having just some fences around and must use as many as five battalions. The reason is that as we fight in forest and mountainous terrain, the enemy often runs away. Therefore, the attacking force can be moderate, but the encircling force must be more numerous.

That is the question of being flexible and creative. President Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Trai made statements that would point to a high degree of creativity.

President Ho Chi Minh said: "Today the grasshopper fights against the elephant, But tomorrow the elephant will be disemboweled."²

Nguyen Trai said: "By avoiding the enemy's strong spots and striking at his weak spots, By avoiding the real and striking at the unreal, We may use just one-half of our strength but can score an achievement twice as great."³

These statements sound illogical and contrary to conventional laws and principles. If we understand them in accordance with conventional logic, it is truly so, i.e., they are hard to explain. But if we understand them in accordance with dialectical logic, they are understandable. For things move forward, involve struggle, and lead to resolving contradictions. What is progressive will develop and what is backward will be done away with. Our ancestors' statements indicate that their methodology was correct.

Without methodology, there cannot be perception of things as such, nor guidelines in regard to development of things as such, nor the ability to advance arguments as such. The wars for the good cause of our people and the two wars of resistance against France and America have been great creations in terms of military arguments just because there was correct methodology.

Methodology helps to formulate guidelines for strategic and operational combat circumstances. This is a matter of tricks and circumstances. If the enemy is strong, we must lure him to where it is easy for us to destroy him. In the resistance against France, we lured the French to the difficult mountainous terrain in order to destroy them. Toward the end of the resistance against America, relying on our strength in the people's war, we became stronger than the enemy and, consequently, in the spring

of 1975, we struck at the enemy's cities and capital and destroyed clusters of enemy divisions.

In military operations, on the basis of the people's war, our three branches of service resorted to tactical maneuvers and deceitful moves, dispersed and cut off the enemy, and created their people's war posture which was intertwined with enemy moves. Then we concentrated our forces on destroying clusters of enemy forces, fighting to thwart enemy surprise counterattacks and rescuing moves, or delivering deadly blows against the enemy in both large military bases and cities and against his hard-core mobile forces, with destruction of large segments and scoring of victory without a battle.

As we direct military operations, we must be very responsive, flexible, and decisive in order to seize the opportunities.

In the spring of 1975, we acted in time to seize the opportunities to thwart the surprise counterattack of Division 23 in Buon Ma Thuat and thus scored victory.

In the spring of 1972, we missed the opportunities to attack the City of Kontum because we had not used in time the regiments of Division 320 and Regiment 28, which had been assigned the task of attacking the City of Kontum, had been waiting for Division 2 returning from Tan Canh; and when we used Regiment 66 as a reserve force, we failed to use it in a concentrated manner. The way we learned about the use of reserve units in books was not put into application. Books are not always usable in battlefield realities, but they are sometimes usable. We must be very flexible, creative, nonmechanical, and nonconservative. Books are necessary, but their application must be flexible and wise. That is methodology, too.

The thinking on tricks and circumstances is a high form of thinking among command and staff cadres. We and the enemy are fighting a fierce battle and are engaged in a life-and-death struggle. In armed struggle, as well as in other aspects of struggle, there are very many contradictions. We must know how to analyze and resolve contradictions. In order to resolve contradictions between the weak and the strong we must use tricks and circumstances, transform weakness into strength, use spiritual strength to further increase material strength, and use the few to replace the many. In order to resolve contradictions between mobility and surprise attack we must use local troops, militia and self-defense forces, special-operations troops, and special mobile troops in place of aircraft, helicopters, and so on to strike at the rear of the enemy. First of all, we must have determination and a staunch desire to fight the enemy. Then we must devise tricks to fight the enemy and create new battle formation and opportunities to destroy him. Therefore, the greatest trick is to deceive the enemy and the best scheme is to manipulate him. To be able to deceive and manipulate the enemy means to have the surprise element and initiative. And both surprise and initiative are the source of combat vitality. Therefore, we must try to achieve the

maximum degree of surprise and initiative. About battle formation, we must divide the enemy before fighting him and tie him up in order to destroy him.

About battle formation and opportunities, we must create our own battle formation while destroying the enemy's. To create our own battle formation is to create a labyrinthine situation, an eight-diagram battle scheme of the people's war, so as to make the enemy utterly confused and lost. To destroy enemy battle formation is to intertwine it with action in the people's war by destroying storehouses, airfields, ports, and roads; pushing the enemy into passive and defensive action; making everywhere unsafe for him; and inflicting upon him losses and division prior to any combat action, and making him lose the posture of continuity, with confusion and vacillation affecting the psychology and morale of enemy troops.

As the battle formation becomes more complicated and dangerous, circumstances take place in a more simplistic manner, opportunities appear sooner, and the manner of handling things becomes surer.

The general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975 was an example of the art of combining tricks, battle formation, and opportunities.

We pulled the enemy to two sides of the front line: At the northern end, we held down two enemy reserve strategic divisions in Hue and Da Nang; at the southern end, we held down the enemy forces of Military Region 3-III Corps and the remaining enemy reserve force in Saigon-Bien Hoa. In the middle of the front line along the coast in southern Trung Bo and the Central Highlands there only remained the forces of Military Region 2-II Corps. Because the enemy was strong at the two ends and showed neglect and was weak in the middle, we struck and broke the middle of the front line with a large operational-strategic group, cut South Vietnam into halves, thwarted and totally upset the enemy's strategic battle formation, caused successive destruction, and forced his quick collapse.

Forces constitute the material base that determines action. Our armed forces must be the three branches of service and all-people armed forces. That is the thinking on organizing the people's armed forces.

We must organize the armed forces into units ranging in size from small to large and conforming to the country's real conditions and to the fighting methods adopted for different periods in the war between us and the enemy. These are scientific bases.

To organize units capable of carrying out operational tasks is the greatest need in the job of organizing the armed forces. Sometimes regiment and division are the basic units needed to launch an operation. Sometimes division and corps [quan doan] are the basic units for launching an operation or for independently launching an operation. Sometimes corps clusters launch an operation. In addition to the local armed forces and the

militia and self-defense forces, we also need the main-force blows. The hard blows that create shock waves in the war are delivered by divisions, corps, and groups. These units are organized into operational and strategic groups in order to deliver decisive operational and strategic blows. Only by so doing can we resolve war in a resolute and total manner.

Weapons and equipment of the armed forces are the tools for combat. As in production, the more advanced the tools of production are, the greater productivity will be. With the characteristics of the Vietnamese situation and the development of the world, our equipment is both modern and rudimentary and improved-rudimentary. Modern equipment is both motorized and manually handled. Manual handling can be rudimentary, classic, and modern and advanced. Antitank and antiaircraft guided weapons in the modern and advanced handling category are the guided missiles Stinger and Dragon that America equipped the Afghan reactionaries with or similar ones made by the Soviet Union. Today, in addition to these missiles having twisted-grooved launchers, they also manufacture ballistic missiles using smooth-tube launchers. Many countries in the world have copied the Soviet-made Katyusha ballistic missile. And there have appeared in the world various kinds of large-sized ballistic missiles fired from multitubed launchers, having firing range of 40-50 kilometers, and placed on platforms using either tires or tractor treads. China has made much progress in this regard. The tendency to use ballistic missiles should be further encouraged.

As to individual weapons, in addition to B40's and B41's, we should manufacture the kind of grenade launchers carried on shoulders like the American M79's. Our main-force troops, local troops, and members of the militia and self-defense forces all can be equipped with these weapons.

The strategic and operational thinking must originate from the military thoughts so as to formulate the military art. This thinking must rely on the revolutionary outlook on life as its foundation and on the methodology of Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism as its base and the tool to promote awareness. Only then can the thinking be accurate and action creative. On the basis of the characteristics and nature of Vietnamese war and the political and military line and views of our party, we can summarize the Vietnamese military thoughts as follows:

1. The thought on people's war having the nature of a good cause.
2. The thought on offensive action with firmness and stratagem.
3. The dialectical thought with creativity.

Military thoughts guide the military art. Our military art both inherits the national quintessence and traditions and applies the practical experiences drawn from the two wars of resistance against France and America while

selectively absorbing the advanced military knowledge of the world, first of all of the Soviet Union. We can summarize the Vietnamese military art as follows:

To use alternatively the good cause and the surprise element, the former to fight and the latter to win.

To resort interchangeably to the real and the unreal, with the former being used as the latter and vice versa.

To intertwine battle formations, to strike both the front and the back.

To use half of the strength, to get twice the work done.

To fight by means of tricks, to win by circumstances.

The Vietnamese military thoughts and Vietnamese military art are revolutionary and progressive. They have been challenged throughout the growth of the nation and tested in a harsh manner in the two wars of resistance against France and America.

The Vietnamese military thoughts and Vietnamese military art are the peak of Vietnamese military science and theories in the present era. They are the precious assets that help to strongly defend socialist Vietnam and to make it more prosperous and stronger everyday.

Footnotes

1. Ho Chi Minh, *Collected Writings*, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, p 340.

2. Ibid., p 471.

3. *Complete Works*, Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 59.

ECONOMIC

State Allocates Funds for Tuy Ha Oil Refinery

902E0163A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 12 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] In the 1990 plan, the state has decided to select the Tuy Ha (Long Thanh District, Dong Nai Province) oil refinery area construction project as a key state-level project and will invest 5.7 billion dong in this project, increasing the rate of construction by 9.5 times the 1989 level.

The Oil Refinery Construction Corporation has welcomed many additional well-trained construction units from Joint Machine Assembly Enterprise 45 arriving to coordinate in construction of this project. First of all, the 1,100 square meters of housing under construction during 1989 will be completed for use during January 1990 and an additional 6,100 square meters will be built to promptly accept the 2,500 cadres, workers and civil servants coming to work on the project. The construction forces will build areas for producing concrete and machining steel construction structures, material and equipment depots, carpentry, machine and fuel shops, etc.

It has been learned that the Tuy Ha Oil Refinery, with a general annual output of 6 million tons, will strive during phase one to achieve an annual output of 3 million tons.

Ho Chi Minh City 1989 Tax Collection Problems

902E0162A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 31 Dec 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Quoc Vinh]

[Text] During 1989, taxes were one of the policies of concern being debated by many people because of their relation to the lives of a large part of the city's population. Taxes were also a "burning" issue in the press and in seminars held by various circles, sectors, and people's councils at all levels. We think an honest and objective evaluation of tax work during 1989 should not stop at the data collected and achievement of norms and plans but should have an observation of the socioeconomic problems presented by tax collection.

The municipal tax sector during 1989 collected 120 billion, meeting the legal norm assigned by the city, but 20 billion short of the city's struggle norm (140 billion) and 51 billion short of the norm assigned by the Ministry of Finance (171 billion). These are official figures of the Tax Branch in a report submitted to the Municipal People's Committee on 25 December 1989. Regarding the activities of the tax sector, we wish to briefly state one phrase: *simultaneous shortfall and overcollection*—a condition harshly revealed during the past few years.

Why is the tax sector confused and passive?

During 1989, the tax sector was confused and passive in its course of operations, including work plans, compared with the past several years. Why? Because the starting point of the tax collection objective was changed by economic life...and was abandoned! At the beginning of 1989, the tax sector issued an industrial trade tax norm based on the following projections: an increase in the production rate by 15 to 20 percent; and an increase in average prices for the entire year by 50 percent. The actual figures were not precisely like that: the industrial and small industry and handicraft production figures for the entire year of 1989 within the city only attained a total output value of 41.4 billion, 83 percent of the annual plan and only 95.4 percent of the 1988 level. Prices did not increase but have instead gradually decreased since the beginning of the second quarter of 1989. According to reports of the Municipal Statistics Department, the monthly average rate of increase in prices of 11.3 percent during 1988 slipped to 1.9 percent during 1989. Clearly, the "charms" long used by the tax sector to increase collections, an increase in the value of the dong and an increased production rate, are no longer in vogue. On the other hand, after the resolution of the Ministry of Finance on developing economic components was issued, series of private and non-state operated enterprises, corporations, jewelry shops, etc., came into being, preventing the tax sector from promptly grasping

the situation to issue a suitable tax collection formula. The tax collection shortfall in this area was not small.

When local areas and sectors "fill holes" in their budget and capital by allowing private individuals to hide in the shadows!

The objectives of tax collection this year increased and there were many more "holes" than the previous year (96,568 households during 1989 compared with 84,220 households during 1988, an increase of 12,339). *Along with the familiar tax objectives, there was also an additional new objective, private individuals hiding in the shadows, disguised as state agencies.* The reason for this situation was that many precincts and districts with budget shortages, and some still with deficit budgets—looked for ways to save the situation by allowing private operators to hide in the shadow of state stores, state-operated "trade centers," agents, and trade skill applications. An inspection of only two out of 10 subward commercial-trade centers in the first Precinct showed a shortfall of 624 million dong in tax collections during a period of four months. A sample inspection of 210 private businessmen in the hardware and appliance sector in three corporations showed a shortfall of 2.6 billion dong during four months of operation. Generally, the entire city has an estimated shortfall in the collection of taxes on private trade skill applications hiding in the shadow of state "brands" of 25 to 30 billion dong. The use of private individuals to attract capital but "dodge taxes" is spreading in many sectors of commerce, service, food and beverage, capital construction and the precious metals business, including state economic agencies in the form of livelihood enterprises. There has been and presently exists a "seesaw battle" between the tax sector and economic units employing private operators: the tax sector wants to separate private operators from their "state shell" to collect taxes and conversely, these units don't want tax sector interference in order to collect profits for the budget—naturally at a level much lower than the taxes.

Exorbitant and Redundant Tax Collection

The tax bureau is registered as a unit which every year completes its collection norms early but this collection step has been questioned by a number of people. A number of SAIGON GIAI PHONG readers have written their concerns: why is it that after paying customs duties on a color television set, a luxury item, the buyer is not required to pay any other kind of tax at all while conversely, a Cub motorcycle is subject to an additional registration fee? During the middle of 1989, the price of a 78 50-cubic centimeter junkyard Cub motorcycle was only one to 1.2 gold ingots, rising to 1.5 to 1.7 ingots after adjustments were made for customs duties, but was subject to a registration fee of almost another ingot. This is only one example of the hundreds of kinds of similar redundant or inconsistent taxes collected on many items of the goods sector. An increase in customs duties and the use of tax stamps by the Ministry of Finance on

imported beer, liquor, and cigarettes to protect domestically produced goods and restrict consumption seems totally "ineffective!" The price of these goods has not increased because customs and market management barriers have been unable to halt their surging infiltration of the city. One condition worthy of attention is that while many small businessmen have ceased operations due to payment of unregulated taxes, mini-marts and air conditioner stores spring up like mushrooms with none at all closing due to regulated taxes!

At a recent session of the 8th National Assembly, Minister of Finance Hoang Quy submitted a report on renovation of the tax system. Surely revisions will soon be made in the tax policy. In this article, we have only presented a few of the unresolved problems in the city's economic area from the tax management angle. If these problems are not resolved, the situation of simultaneous tax shortfall and overcollection will be even more serious during 1990.

Coffee Export Reaches 37 Million Rubles, 2.3 Million Dollars

902E0163B Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 17 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] The Vietnam Coffee-Cacao Association, an organization of coffee and cacao producers, processors, and exporters, was established during the beginning of January 1990 in Da Lat. Association members closely coordinate in production and business, and join in resolving economic and technical problems, building stable domestic and foreign markets, and protecting the interests of participating members and of the Vietnam coffee and cacao sector on the world market.

During the past 14 years, the coffee growing area of the entire country has increased from 10,000 to 120,000 hectares, and annual coffee exports have increased from 3,000 or 4,000 tons to 40,000 and 50,000 tons.

During 1989 alone, coffee exports reached nearly 37 million rubles and more than 2.3 million dollars. The cacao crop has developed in the provinces of Hau Giang, Ben Tre, An Giang, Dong Thap, etc. At this time, the entire country has more than 5,000 hectares of cacao of stable yield; with many plots producing yields of more than 1 ton per hectare.

Participating in the Vietnam Coffee-Cacao Association are more than 70 members, comprising state operated, collective, family and privately operated units from 17 provinces, cities and central agencies.

Binh Dinh Province Exports Titanium

42090020A

[Editorial Report] On 23 January 1990 the Hanoi daily NHAN DAN reported that large amounts of titanium have been found in almost all coastal districts in the area formerly known as Nghia Binh Province [now Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces] in central Vietnam.

Before 1988, using manual methods, Binh Dinh Province produced only a few hundred tons of titanium per year. In 1988-89 however, production rose to 2,000 tons per year as a result of the use of newly acquired machines and small equipment. In 1989 Binh Dinh sold 2,000 tons of titanium to a Japanese company on a trial basis.

Increased Coffee Acreage, Exports

42090019A

[Editorial Report] According to the Hanoi daily NHAN DAN of 16 January 1990, the coffee acreage in Vietnam has increased from 10,000 hectares to 120,000 hectares in the last 14 years. Coffee exports also increased during the same period, from 3-4,000 tons to 40-50,000 tons per year. In 1989 alone, coffee exports amounted to nearly 37 million rubles and more than U.S.\$2.3 million.

City Population Growth Decreases During 1989

902E0163C Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 17 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] According to the Municipal Population-Family Planning Committee, the city's natural population growth rate has continued to decline each year (except for a slight increase in 1987): 1983 - 1.95 percent; 1984 - 1.81 percent; 1985 - 1.71 percent; 1986 - 1.63 percent; 1987 - 1.64 percent; 1988 - 1.53 percent; and 1989 - 1.46 percent. Last year, nine precincts in the city satisfactorily maintained the birth control movement: the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 10th, and 11th Precincts and Phu Nhuan and Tan Binh Wards. As a result, the natural population growth rate declined from last year, thanks to continued promotion of the family planning movement by sections, sectors and mass organizations. According to city estimates, efforts must be made during 1990 to achieve a natural population growth not exceeding 1.35 percent, that is .11 percent less than 1989. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to promote propaganda and education, to consolidate and strengthen professional cadre organization, and to provide additional material facilities and equipment for family planning.

SOCIAL

Articles in New Student Publication Reviewed

902E0171B Paris QUE ME in Vietnamese Feb 90
pp 16, 19

[Article by Thanh Tam]

[Text] KHAT VONG has no statement to make, and no specific action policy. KHAT VONG has also made no demand to the authorities. KHAT VONG is only heavily laden with the anxieties and apprehensions of Vietnamese young over the tragic situation of the country.

These apprehensions are clearly expressed in each article and sentence. Differing from the other publications of the young abounding to this time, KHAT VONG has

never had a funny story or a sweet and pure poem. In the two issues we have read, all of the articles, most of them extremely short, concentrated on one theme: the emotional impressions of youths confronting the changes of the present situation.

The apprehensions of KHAT VONG are fairly diverse. There are concerns about society, history and the country. There are even apprehensions about the year 2000!

Phan Thanh Huong, in an essay entitled "The City, After 6 in the Afternoon," painting settings of jostling and disorder in front of the dance halls, smoke-filled coffee shops, and drunken clamor in the pubs, worried:

"Many friends have raised their voice in a demand for freedom but is this all there is to freedom?"

"No, this is only the kind of freedom provided by sleep to forget the tragedies."

Le Tuan, in the article entitled "A 5-Minute Conversation on the Sidewalk," in an extremely terse manner, in only 235 words, viciously attacked communism. Below is the entire text of Le Tuan's composition:

"I asked a friend who lives, eats, sleeps, makes love, fathers and raises his children on Ly Tu Trong Street, 'How many children do you have?'

"He replied, 'Four.'

"I looked down at the mat. His wife and four children were lying there in filth. The oldest child was about 10. The youngest was about one and there were two others. All four, along with their mother, were pale, thin, and terribly dirty.

"I asked, 'Have you been here long?'

'Four years.'

'Where were you before?'

'New economic.'

'Was life in new economic difficult?'

'Very difficult.'

"I was a little surprised by the hesitant replies of my friend but patiently continued, 'Was it as difficult as your life now?'

"He replied, still curtly, 'Much more difficult.'

"Ending the conversation, he bent down over the stove made of three bricks from which thick smoke was wafting. I got on my bicycle and rode off, with questions in my mind, 'Could life in the new economic zones be more difficult and tragic than life on the sidewalk? Could this be the truth? Could it be that what we have toiled to build and stridently propagandize is the same as what we are condemning and demanding be discarded?'"

Precisely 235 words. In those 235 words, the final 25 are the most important, "Could it be that what we have toiled to build and stridently propagandize is the same as what we are condemning and demanding be discarded?" Perhaps the author was not referring only to the new economic problem or to living out on the sidewalk.

Hoang Nga, in an article entitled "Age and Revolution", after reviewing the age of those participating in and holding high-level positions in the Indochinese Communist Party before 1945, made the observation, "With the exception of Uncles Ho and Ton, the leaders of the Indochinese Communist Party before 1945 were all extremely young, most of them only about 30 years old, with some less than 20. Nevertheless, they steered the revolutionary ship across countless cataracts and rapids, and through many waves and storms." Then Hoang Nga concluded, "History has left us such a shining lesson but many people at the present time appear suspicious of the capabilities of the young, daring not even to let them hold a subward chairman position. Truly ridiculous."

Le Van Triet, in an article entitled "Recalling a Story of Days Gone By, related the example of Emperor Tran Nhan Tong who renounced his throne to become a monk in the mountains, and with admiration of the emperor's disdain for the benefits of the philosopher class in the past, used his pen to satirize those clinging to their positions in the present. "Oh, how often have we heard the courageous and noble statement of Emperor Tran Nhan Tong, 'We consider the golden armchair a worn-out shoe.' Oh, how often?"

Pham Ngan Khanh, in an article entitled "The Phenomenon of College Graduates Abandoning Their Jobs," brought up an extremely fine thought, "We have been educated to do something, not to endure something. It is truly easy to understand when a teacher leaves a school in a remote area and returns to the city to become a drifter because, despite his resolution to remain with the school, he can do nothing but wait for the months and years to erode his mind and turn him into someone totally out of step with the extraordinary progress of science."

It may be said that the primary theme of the articles written in the first and third issues of KHAT VONG was aimed at demanding the authorities to reevaluate the abilities of the young and subsequently, to use them in a more reasonable and rational manner. No one can continue to calmly serve as an "assault soldier" following the style of "wherever needed, the youth are; and wherever difficult, there are youth" as before. The serious and damaging defeats of communism since 1975 have sown deep doubts within the souls of the Vietnamese young. They no longer have confidence in the enlightenment of those who consider themselves to be the "pinnacle of human intelligence." They demand that the authorities study, determine, and master the truth in everything they do and be ready to take responsibility for those things.

The demands above, actually only modest, are fundamental because, one of the reasons for the retardation in

Vietnam, besides the study of Marxism-Leninism itself, is the doting and advanced age of the authorities. This doting and advanced age is the father of conservatism and dogmatism, and more importantly, of dictatorship and tyranny.

We recall one of the demands of the Ho Chi Minh City Former Resistance Fighters Club in the newspaper TRUYEN THONG KHANG CHIEN that QUE ME excerpted in Issue 104 with a similar theme: true renovation must begin with personnel renovation, specifically with rejuvenation of the leadership cadre ranks.

It would be an illusion if we continue to expect thick and absentminded brains like those of Le Duc Tho, Do Muoi, Vo Chi Cong and even Nguyen Van Linh to some morning or afternoon become broad-minded and intelligent or to know how to adapt to a world situation that is changing beyond their ability to imagine.

New Student Publication Introduced

902E0171A Paris QUE ME in Vietnamese Feb 90 p 15

[Article by Ngan Ha]

[Text] After the newspaper TRUYEN THONG KHANG CHIEN was threatened and forced to cease publication, another newspaper suddenly appeared in Vietnam, also extremely brilliant and illegally circulated, the newspaper KHAT VONG of the pupils and students of Ho Chi Minh City.

We have only seen two issues of KHAT VONG: No. 1, published in June 1989 and No. 3, published in September 1989.

KHAT VONG is plain in appearance, 14 x 21 cm, with only 16 mimeographed pages. The cover page has a white background with two words, KHAT VONG, in extremely sharp, glossy black and prominent letters. Immediately under the words KHAT VONG is the line, "Fervent voice of the fourth generation," followed by the issue number. That's all. There is no address for the editor's office nor is there a publisher's name.

Beginning each issue is an editorial bearing the general title: *Things about which the truth must be told*, followed by the signature, "Policy Group." However, in a constant search of the two available issues, we have been unable to find anything revealing their identity. Only in the article *Things about which the truth must be told* in the first issue was there a short, general and fairly vague designation: *We, general school and college students, called affectionately by the party the fourth generation, completely support the party's policy of renovation to turn Vietnam into a prosperous, free and independent nation, and are using this newspaper in hopes of arousing apprehension in others of our group about the fate of the country so that everyone, from his own standpoint and with conditions available to him, can strive to accomplish something truly beneficial to the country.*"

The editorial also asserted: "We are not an organization, neither a political nor a social organization. We are only a group of youths 18 to 28 years old in search of close friends and comrades."

We have inquired of many people, especially recent arrivals from Vietnam, but no one has a clear understanding of the KHAT VONG group. Some have made a guess—only a guess—it is a sprout of the struggle movement for democracy and human rights among the young generation in Vietnam at the present time.

Whatever it is, in our general opinion, KHAT VONG is also a unique phenomenon in Vietnam at this time. The newspaper is tormented, tossed and turned by the situation in the country as was TRUYEN THONG KHANG CHIEN but with things and reasons concerning the young, and the language used in KHAT VONG is more aggressive, more hot-tempered and generally speaking stronger.

The introduction of KHAT VONG is the that of the specks of flame beginning to burn at home. We have no greater hope than one day soon, that flame will spread swiftly and widely, causing Vietnam to become an infinite sea of fire; like the recent seas of fire in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia; to totally incinerate the shackles and chains now binding the people to poverty.

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Vietnamese Personalities 42090017A

[Editorial Report] The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisk indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.

Dinh Thi Anh [DINH THIJ ANH]

*Member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association; *associate editor-in-chief of KHOA HOC DOI SONG newspaper; she was elected to the above position at the 5th congress of the Vietnam Journalists Association. (HANOI MOI 19 Oct 89 p 1)

Nguyen Thi Van Anh [NGUYEENX THIJ VAAN ANH]

*Member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association; *associate editor-in-chief of NHI DONG newspaper; her name was on the list of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association. (HANOI MOI 19 Oct 89 p 1)

Mai Van Be [MAI VAWN BES]

*Member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association; *deputy secretary of the Dong

Nai Journalists Association; his name was on the list of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association. (HANOI MOI 19 Oct 89 p 1)

Le Khac Binh [LEE KHAWCS BINHF]

*Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Council; former standing vice-chairman of the HCMC People's Committee; he was elected to the above position at the first meeting of the HCMC People's Council on 8-9 Dec 89. (NHAN DAN 12 Dec 89 p 1)

Nguyen Dang Cuong [NGUYEENX DAWNG CUWOWNG]

*Director and editor-in-chief of Lam Dong Province's radio and TV station; *member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association; he was recently elected to the latter position at the association's 5th congress. (HANOI MOI 19 Oct 89 p 1)

Pham Tien Duat [PHAMJ TIEENS ZUAATJ]

*Member of the editorial staff of VAN NGHE newspaper; *member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association; he was elected to the latter position at the association's 5th congress. (HANOI MOI 19 Oct 89 p 1)

Thai Duy [THAIS ZUY], aka Tran Dinh Van

*Chairman of the Control Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association; *member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association; he was elected to the above positions at the association's 5th congress. (HANOI MOI 19 Oct 89 p 1)

Bay Du [BAYR ZUWJ] aka Nguyen Vo Danh

Standing deputy secretary of the CPV Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; he was mentioned in an article on party leadership. (NHAN DAN 15 Jan 90 p 3)

Truong Van Da [TRUWOWNG VAWN DA]

*Vice chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Council; former director of the HCMC agricultural office; he was elected to the above position at the first meeting of the HCMC People's Council on 8-9 Dec 89. (NHAN DAN 12 Dec 89 p 1)

Nguyen Ngoc Ha [NGUYEENX NGOCJ HAF], M.D.

*Head of the Overseas Vietnamese department in Ho Chi Minh City; on 22 November 1989 he attended a meeting to discuss various steps to improve DAI DOAN KET newspaper. (DAI DOAN KET 5-12 Dec 89 p 7)

Tran Cong Ham [TRAANF COONG HAMF], *Colonel

*SRV military attache in Laos; on 21 December 1989 he attended a meeting on the 45th founding anniversary of the PPV in Vientiane. (NHAN DAN 25 Dec 89 p 4)

Truong Thi My Hoa [TRUWOWNG THIJ MYX HOA]

*Member of the CPV Central Committee; *vice chairman of the Vietnam Women's Union; she wrote an article on women's role in defending the fatherland. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Oct 89 p 3)

Trinh Tien Hoa [TRINHJ TIEENS HOAF]

Deputy secretary of the CPV Committee, Ha Son Binh Province; he was mentioned in an article on party leadership. (NHAN DAN 15 Jan 90 p 3)

Vu Kim Hanh [VUX KIM HANHJ]

*Editor-in-chief of TUOI TRE newspaper in Ho Chi Minh City; *member of the Secretariat of the Vietnam Journalists Association; her name was on the list of the Secretariat of the Vietnam Journalists Association. (HANOI MOI 19 Oct 89 p 1)

Vu Thi Hong [VUX THIJ HOONGF]

Member of the CPV Central Committee; vice chairman of the Control Commission of the CPV Central Committee (Ban Kiem Tra va Thanh Tra Trung Uong Dang); she headed an SRV delegation on a visit to Laos on 21-28 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 30 Dec 89 p 4)

Le At Hoi [LEE AATS HWIJ]

*Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi Municipality; his name was on the list of members of the Hanoi People's Committee. (HANOI MOI 14 Dec 89 P 1)

Nguyen Duc Hung [NGUYEENX DUWCS HUNG]

*SRV representative at the UN; on 27 November 1989 he spoke at a UN meeting on international security. (NHAN DAN 30 Nov 89 p 4)

Vu Manh Kha [VUW MANHJ KHA]

*Vice chairman and secretary of the People's Council, Hanoi Municipality; his name was on the list of people recently elected to the council. (HANOI MOI 14 Dec 89 p 1)

Nguyen Nam Khanh [NGUYEENX NAM KHANHS], Colonel General

Deputy chief of the Political General Department; member of the Presidium of Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 11 December 1989 he attended a press conference on the 45th founding anniversary of the VPA. (NHAN DAN 12 Dec 89 p 1)

Dang Khoi [DAWNGJ KHOOI], engineer

Standing member of the CPV Committee, Ha Nam Ninh Province; Chairman of the Ha Nam Ninh labor union; *chairman of the Ha Nam Ninh People's Committee; he

was elected to the latter position at the first meeting of the Ha Nam Ninh People's Council. (NHAN DAN 16 Dec 89 pp 1, 4)

Pham Van Lang [PHAMJ VAWN LANG], *Colonel

*SRV military attache in the State of Cambodia; on 19 December 1989 he attended a meeting on the 45th founding anniversary of the VPA in Phnom Penh. (NHAN DAN 25 Dec 89 p 4)

Ngo Xuan Loc [NGOO XUAAN LOOCJ]

Alternate member of the CPV Central Committee, *minister of construction; recently he attended the 6th meeting held by the SRV-USSR intergovernmental committee on cooperation in construction materials. (NHAN DAN 22 Dec 89 p 2)

Pham Loi [PHAMJ LOWIJ]

*Chairman of the Hanoi People's Council, 1989-1994 term; his name was on the list of people recently elected to the council. (HANOI MOI 14 Dec 89 p 1)

Le Mai [LEE MAI]

*Assistant to the minister of foreign affairs; on 8 January 1990 he attended a meeting on the 69th anniversary of the Iraq army in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 9 Jan 90 p 4)

Mai Xuan Minh [MAI XUAAN MINH]

*Chairman of the People's Committee, Thanh Hoa Province; on 17 December 1989 he welcomed the Indian ambassador visiting his province. (NHAN DAN 23 Dec 89 p 4)

Nguyen Vinh Nghiep [NGUYEENX VINHX NGHIEEPJ]

Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee; he was re-elected to the above positions at the first meeting of the HCMC People's Council on 8-9 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 12 Dec 89 p 1)

Le Huy Ngo [LEE HUY NGOJ]

Member of the CPV Central Committee; *CPV secretary of Thanh Hoa Province; recently he welcomed a Soviet delegation visiting his province. (NHAN DAN 4 Jan 90 p 4)

Tran Minh Ngoc [TRAANF MINH NGOCJ]

*Chairman of the People's Committee, Nam Dinh City; he wrote an article on private businesses. (DAI DOAN KET 5-11 Dec 89 p 2)

Nguyen Xuan Nhi [NGUYEENX XUAAN NHIJ] Col, deceased

Former commander of Regiment 672, Group 11, Rear Services General Department; member of the CPV; born in 1937 in Duc Phuc Village, Duc Tho District, Nghe

Tinh Province, he died on 7 November 1989 at Military Hospital 17. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 14 Nov 89 p 4)

Nguyen Ha Phan [NGUYEENX HAF PHAN]

Deputy secretary of the CPV Committee; Hau Giang Province; *Chairman of the Hau Giang People's Committee; he was elected to the latter position at the first meeting of the Hau Giang People's Council. (NHAN DAN 16 Dec 89 p 1)

Do Van Phuc [DOOX VAWN PHUCS], *Colonel

*SRV military attache in the USSR; on 20 December 1989 he attended a meeting on the 45th founding anniversary of the VPA in Moscow. (NHAN DAN 25 Dec 89 p 4)

Vo Nguyen Quang [VOX NGUYEEN QUANGR]

*Chairman of the People's Council, Thua Thien—Hue Province; he was elected to this position at the first meeting of the Thua Thien—Hue People's Council on 8-10 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 18 Dec 89 p 1)

**Tran Quoc Thuan [TRAANF QUOOCJ THUAANJ]
[TRAANF QUOOCJS THUAANJ]**

*Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Council; former judge of the HCMC People's Court; he was elected to the above position at the first meeting of the HCMC People's Council on 8-9 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 12 Dec 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Tuong Thuat [NGUYEENX TUWOWNGF
THUAATJ]**

Standing member of the CPV Committee, Phu Yen Province; *chairman of the Phu Yen People's Council; he was re-elected to the latter position at the first meeting of the Phu Yen People's Council on 11-12 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 18 Dec 89 p 1)

Nguyen Tien [NGUYEENX TIEENS] aka Nguyen Duc Bi, deceased

*Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he was born on 25 December 1923 at Hoang Xa Village, Nam Thanh District, Hai Hung Province; former member of the CPV Committee of Hai Duong and Thai Binh provinces; former SRV consul general in Shanghai; former SRV minister counselor in the PRC, former SRV ambassador to Japan and head of a department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he died following a sudden illness at the Viet-Soviet Hospital on 12 January 1990. (NHAN DAN 13 Jan 90 p 4)

Nguyen Van Tong [NGUYEENX VAWN TONGF]

*Director of the cultural information office in Ho Chi Minh City; his article on managing cultural activities was published in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 13 Jan 89 p 3)

Huynh Truc [HUYNH TRUCS]

Deputy secretary of the CPV Committee, Phu Yen Province; *chairman of the Phu Yen People's Council; he was elected to the latter position at the first meeting of the Phu Yen People's Council on 11-12 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 18 Dec 89 p 1)

Nguyen Trong Yem [NGUYEENX TRONGJ YEEM]

Deputy secretary of the CPV Committee, Hau Giang Province; *chairman of the Hau Giang People's Council; he was elected to the latter position at the first meeting of the Hau Giang People's Council on 7-9 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 16 Dec 89 p 1)

Tran Van Truyen [TRAANF VAWN TRUYEENF], engineer

Standing member of the CPV Committee, Ha Nam Ninh Province; former vice chairman of the Ha Nam Ninh People's Council; *chairman of the Ha Nam Ninh People's Council; he was elected to the latter position at the first meeting of the Ha Nam Ninh People's Council on 10-11 December 1989. (NHAN DAN 16 Dec 89 p 4)

Luong Ngoc Toan [LUWOWNG NGOCJ TOANR]

Vice minister of education; recently he welcomed a Cambodian delegation visiting Vietnam. (GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 27 Nov 89 p 3)

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